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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1.   Choosing a system for the London Mayor election involves a large number of considerations, and 
raises some novel challenges for all existing electoral systems.  Plurality rule elections could produce a 
winning candidate with only minority support, and detract from the success of the office. Double ballot 
systems are unlikely to be implementable under British conditions. A majoritarian system, either the 
Alternative Vote or the Supplementary Vote, would offer the best method of election. 
 
2.   There would be significant advantages in using the Supplementary Vote method for electing the 
Mayor - retaining X voting; a simpler and more transparent counting system; a guarantee that the winner 
would emerge with a visible majority; no risk of  initially low-placed candidates eventually emerging as 
the winner; and the system would be less likely than the Alternative Vote to encourage a large number of 
candidates to stand. 
 
3.    Electing the London Assembly in a proportional way poses some special problems because of its 
small size (24 to 32 members). Plurality rule elections should be ruled out, since they could easily 
produce strong one-party dominance and highly unproportional results. AV and SV elections would not 
ameliorate this problem. The Assembly should be elected by one of three proportional systems - the 
Additional Member System (AMS), list proportional representation (list PR), or the Single Transferable 
Vote (STV). 
 
4.    The best performing electoral systems for the Assembly in this study were: 
• A ‘classic’ AMS system with 16 local seats (each covering two London boroughs), and either four 
‘quadrant’ areas or five constituencies used for electing the top-up members. 
• An AMS system with 14 local seats (some covering three boroughs), and all top-up members elected on 
a London-wide basis. Ballot papers would have to be carefully designed under this system. 
• A List PR system again using either the quadrant or five-constituencies schemas to elect all Assembly 
members. 
• An STV system using the five-constituency schema. 
Any one of these four systems would deliver stable and consistently proportional outcomes. The detailed 
formula to be used in allocating seats under each system should be carefully considered, along with the 
detailed drawing of boundaries for constituencies to best ensure fair apportionment of seats across areas. 
 
5.    A number of other combinations of systems and constituency patterns for electing the Assembly 
produced less satisfactory outcomes and are not recommended: 
• AMS using 16 local seats and six ‘partnership’ constituencies for top-up seats could produce less 
proportional outcomes, depending on the allocation formula being used. 
• List PR in a single London constituency would create information problems for voters because of the 
large number of candidates. 
•  Some STV schemes with four or six constituencies might not produce proportional outcomes 
consistently or in an easily predictable way. 
 
6.    It will be very important to choose voting systems for the Mayor and the Assembly which are 
attractive to voters and operate consistently with each other (and with the electoral systems that London 
voters will be using for other bodies).  SV and AMS systems are the most popular choices with voters, 
while STV is clearly disliked. The consistent combinations of Mayor and Assembly electoral systems 
would be: 
• SV for Mayor and AMS or List PR for the Assembly 
• AV for Mayor and STV for the Assembly. 
 
7.    The responses of political parties to the new voting systems will greatly affect the legitimacy of the 
systems with the public. There is a case for government intervention to guarantee the use of ‘one member 
one vote’ procedures in the selection of party candidates to stand for Mayor, and in the compilation of 
party lists under either the AMS or List PR systems. 
 Part 1: 
 
 
 SCOPE OF THE REPORT 
  
 
 
 
1.1    In early October 1997 LSE Public Policy Group were asked by the Government Office 
for London to examine the following issues in relation to the current choices to be made 
about the election of the London Mayor and of the Assembly: 
• The proportionality of the results achieved under different electoral models, including the 
impact on large established parties, and the scope for independents and minor parties to gain 
representation. 
• The degree of party control of candidate selection, for example, over party lists. Whether 
the system adopted would require parties to be registered, and if so what requirements would 
need to be imposed on candidate selection. 
• The number of candidates each system would be likely to throw up, and options for 
mechanisms for limiting the numbers of candidates (deposits, nomination thresholds etc). 
• The transparency of each model, ie how easy the results are to understand; and what ballot 
papers would look like in different models. 
• How far the models would minimize the potential problems of the Mayor and the Assembly 
pursuing different or opposite objectives. 
• How ‘personality’ might affect mayoral elections . 
 
1.2    We have pursued these issues using data from large-scale national surveys conducted 
by Birkbeck College and LSE immediately after the 1997 and 1992 general elections, in 
which respondents were asked to complete alternative ballot forms for all the major electoral 
systems.  Our surveys covered 8,440 people nationwide in 1997 and 9,600 people in 1992, 
and they  were designed to create accurate regional samples of political alignments. London 
counted as one region in 1992, when our data included 840 London respondents, and as two 
regions (middle London and the London suburbs) in 1997, when our data included 919 
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London respondents. From this basis we have been able to simulate in detail how the various 
electoral systems for the Mayor and the Assembly would work.  
 
1.3   Our methods are described in Appendix 1, and in our published report Making Votes 
Count (London: Democratic Audit of the UK, 1997). Essentially we use our survey data to 
examine how people supporting each political party would cast their second and subsequent 
preferences at a London-wide level. Using the actual general election data from 1997 and 
1992, we then take the London-wide survey data and use it to examine how alternative 
electoral systems would map out on the ground, either in at-large London elections of the 
Mayor and Assembly, or in various constituency schemas for electing the Assembly. This 
approach adjusts for the basic features which distinguish London as a whole from the ret of 
the country.  We believe that this study is soundly based on the best attainable data of how 
Londoners would cast their votes under alternative electoral system, and that the methods 
used make it the most sophisticated examination of these issues possible within the current 
state of knowledge in political science. 
 
1.4    None the less, in reading the report it is important to bear in mind that no simulation 
can accurately mimic the full conditions which will prevail under alternative electoral 
systems. In our research we concentrated on presenting different ballot papers to respondents, 
explaining how they should mark  their preferences on them . But we did not attempt to 
explain how votes would be counted under different systems, nor what their likely political 
consequences would be - for it would be impossible to do this without ‘leading’ respondents 
and thus biasing their answers. Similarly in our simulation approach we could not control for 
differences in people’s second or subsequent preferences which apply at smaller scale than 
London as a whole, for instance at a local level. Such small-scale variations are not amenable 
to investigation even in a survey of our scale.  In addition, of course, there are likely to be 
some strong dynamic effects from the introduction of new electoral systems, which a study of 
this kind cannot incorporate. However, we have used our accumulated knowledge of voter 
behaviour under alternative systems to anticipate some changes, where we have secure 
grounds for doing so. 
 Part 2:  
 
 ELECTING LONDON’S MAYOR 
 
 
 
 
2.1  The position of London Mayor will attract unprecedented public and media interest 
compared with any other local government role. An incumbent Mayor, elected with perhaps 
1.5 million votes or more as a personal mandate, will be a powerful political figure in their 
own right, able to command substantial political legitimacy and exercising influence in a 
direct and observable way over significant public resources. Within the UK the Mayor will 
be the most important directly elected executive, and their activities are likely in practice to 
be as well known to the public as those of Scotland’s First Minister or Cabinet ministers. 
Hence it is probable that there will be strong interest in standing for Mayor, both within 
political parties and from independent candidates - some of whom may well be able to 
assemble a media team and sufficient financial support to mount effective campaigns. 
Designing an electoral system must take account of these unique features of the post.  
 
We look in turn at four possibilities: plurality rule (often known as ‘first-past-the-post’); the 
double ballot; the Alternative Vote;  and its main variant, the Supplementary Vote. 
 
PLURALITY RULE 
2.2  In this system whichever candidate gains most votes (a plurality) wins, even if they do 
not command majority support. However small their fraction of support, the leading 
candidate on first preferences is the winner. In the United States mayors are almost uniformly 
elected using plurality rule in ‘at large’ elections.  To see how the system might work in a 
similar city-wide contest in London , we could simply aggregate the party votes across the 
capital in the two most recent general elections. The winners (with their vote shares) would 
have been:  
on the basis of 1992 general election votes:  Conservative 45.3 per cent 
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on the basis of 1997 general election votes: Labour 49.5 per cent 
In each case the leading party’s support exceeds the winning vote share achieved by the 
Labour government in its landslide 1997 victory (44 per cent of the GB vote), or by 
Conservative governments in the 1980s (around 43 per cent of the GB vote). In 1997 Labour 
came within a whisker of securing an overall majority in London votes at the general 
election.  If these winner’s shares were repeated in elections for the Mayor, and the number 
of candidates stayed the same as in Westminster constituency elections, there would not be 
acute legitimacy problems in using a plurality rule system of voting.  
 
2.3  However, for the reasons outlined in paragraph 2.1,  the number of candidates for Mayor 
is likely to be significantly greater than for local parliamentary contests, with the bulk of 
votes being distributed over a larger number of viable candidates. In voting for a directly 
elected chief executive people are much more likely to be influenced by the personality and 
popularity of individual candidates, and less likely to support or be constrained by party 
labels. In an ICM poll for the Evening Standard (16 October 1997) seven names attracted 
more than or equal to 5 per cent support (even after the inclusion of one prominent ‘star’ 
candidate attracting 47 per cent support, who may not be likely to run).  Many of the 
candidate names already suggested in the press and on TV have good media recognition and 
cross-party appeal. So we cannot assume that vote shares in the Mayoral election will 
necessarily approximate the political parties’ current or historical levels of support in 
London. 
 
2.4  The clear danger with plurality rule is that a race may occur between three or four evenly 
matched candidates from which the winning candidate emerges with only significant 
minority support. In a close four-way Commons contest in 1992 in Inverness the winning 
candidate achieved just 26.2 per cent of the vote. A similar outcome in the Mayoral election, 
with three quarters of Londoners voted for someone other than the winner, could seriously 
detract from the political credibility of the office as a whole, and create exceptional 
difficulties in relations between the Mayor and the Assembly. We would consequently 
strongly advise considering instead the use of a majoritarian system of voting, one that will 
effectively guarantee that the winning candidate commands majority assent. This category 
includes the double ballot system, the alternative vote and the supplementary vote. 
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THE DOUBLE BALLOT SYSTEM 
2.5   In Europe the dominant modes of directly electing city Mayors are double ballot 
systems (notably in France and Italy). A first vote with a full slate of candidates is held in 
week 1, and the results are counted and published. With this information voters can assess the 
relative popularity of candidates, with a final ballot being held in week 2. Election rules at 
this second stage may either enforce a run-off between the top two candidates, or restrict the 
candidates allowed to run again to those with a certain minimum vote share. These more 
stringent criteria for entry into the second round, plus the evidence from the first round vote 
about which candidates have a chance of winning and which do not, commonly produce 
withdrawals or alliances between previously rival candidates or parties in favour of the 
leading candidate of different blocs (left, right and centre).  
 
2.6   There is very little evidence on how a double ballot system could work under British 
conditions - and unfortunately we could not include this system as an option in our 1992 or 
1997 surveys. But from reviewing what little relevant data is available, we conclude that the 
double ballot is highly unlikely to prove popular with British voters. It would entail a change 
of voting day: all double ballot systems that we know of operate with Sunday voting. And in 
most countries turnout falls appreciably on the second ballot, even though voters are used to 
the system. 
 
2.7   A feasible target rate of turnout for the London Mayor elections would be below the 
general election rates (70 to 75 per cent), but would be well above the most recent London 
borough elections (45 per cent). If a scheme of election for the capital generates a turnout of 
around 55 to 60 per cent, we would regard this performance as highly successful. A 
significant second ballot fall-off from this level could create legitimacy problems.  
 
2.8   There is also little benefit in proceeding with a double-ballot scheme, since almost all of 
its desirable features could be recreated within a single round of voting by adopting one of 
the one-shot majoritarian systems discussed below. We therefore have not further 
investigated how double ballot systems might work in London. 
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THE ALTERNATIVE VOTE 
2.9   Although there are a very large number of proportional voting methods for electing 
multi-member assemblies, the number of viable options for choosing a single office holder is 
much more restricted. There are really only two or three majoritarian systems - the alternative 
vote (AV); its main variant (called the ‘supplementary vote’); or some modified form of 
AV.1  
 
2.10   The alternative vote (AV) has been used in Australia for electing the House of 
Representatives for many years, in Papua New Guinea for a short time, and in the Pacific 
island of Nauru - in all cases to elect members of the legislature in Westminster-style small 
local constituencies. AV is rather a rarely used electoral system, even for legislatures, and we 
do not know of any case where it has been employed in a single constituency of the scale of 
London, or for an election where  a long list of viable candidates seeks executive office 
directly. Using AV to elect the London Mayor would thus be a novel situation. 
 
2.11   The AV ballot paper gives voters a list of names, and asks them to number them in an 
order of preference from 1 to x, where x is the number of candidates. Figure 1 shows the AV 
ballot used in our 1997 study. Voters can choose how many numbers to put down, ranging 
from a single 1 for their most preferred candidate, through just two or three preferences, to a 
complete slate. In general the more preferences voters mark the more likely it is that their 
preferences will be effective in shaping the outcome (although this is not invariably true).  
 
 
1 In academic political science there are proposals of many kinds which could be used for a Mayoral 
contest. Some methods involve voters having say 10 points to ‘spend’ and then awarding points to different 
candidates. Others ask voters to indicate whether they approve of or disapprove of every candidate on the list. In 
general these approaches are technically ingenious and most offer fairly esoteric intellectual attractions. But 
these schemes have not yet been applied in liberal democracies for real elections and so we discount them as 
politically feasible possibilities in the rest of this report. We would be happy to supply further information on the 
available options if requested, however. 
2.12   We can predict how British voters are likely to behave given this choice with a high 
level of confidence. In both our 1997 and 1992 studies we gave respondents AV ballot papers 
and they expressed choices very consistently as follows: 
Table 2.1: Preferences expressed on AV ballot papers, Great Britain 1997 and 1992 
 
    % of respondents indicating a choice:  
 
 
 
First 
 
Second 
 
Third 
 
Fourth 
 
Fifth 
 
N responding 
 
1997 survey 
 
97 
 
83 
 
67 
 
31 
 
24 
 
          1,922 
 
1992 survey 
 
95 
 
74 
 
68 
 
na 
 
na 
 
          8,925 
 
Note: The 1997 AV ballot included more names than the 1992 paper, which in England and Wales had only four 
possible responses - hence the ‘na’ entries. 
  
 
Around one person in eight had only a first preference for one party; another quarter 
expressed only two preferences on the AV ballot; and over a third gave up numbering after 
marking three preferences. In 1997 seven out of ten respondents gave up after marking four 
preferences.  
 
2.13   These rates were on small ballot papers for local seats featuring only five or six 
candidates, however. An AV ballot paper for the London Mayor might have around 20 names 
on it. We would expect this situation to generate somewhat more responses - with around two 
thirds of people completing a slate of five or so names ranking the three major party 
candidates plus any well known independent candidates (those with ‘star’ quality). A 
significant minority of people would also include reputable minor parties (such as the 
Greens) in their rankings.   
 
2.14   The next stage in AV is how the votes are counted, (which is essentially the same as 
the Single Transferable Vote for electing a single person). First preferences are counted up, 
and if any one candidate secures over 50 per cent of the votes they are elected immediately 
and the process ceases. If no one has majority support, the bottom-placed candidate is 
eliminated and the second preferences on their ballot papers are distributed amongst 
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candidates still in the race. If no one still has majority support, the new bottom candidate is 
eliminated and the second preferences on their ballot papers are also redistributed. This 
process of elimination continues until either: 
-  one candidate has more than 50 per cent of the total valid votes for remaining 
candidates; or  
-  there are only two candidates left in the race, when the leading candidate 
automatically wins. 
 
2.15   In practice when AV is used for small local seats with only a few candidates the most 
efficacious preferences (those which typically decide the election) are the first and second 
preferences. Table 2.2 shows the distribution of our London respondents’ first and second 
preferences in 1997 and 1992, assessed in slightly differing ways - the 1992 pattern from 
responses to an AV question, and the 1997 pattern from re-programming responses to an 
STV ballot, (which might prove a better guide to how a Mayoral election with multiple 
candidates would run). In British politics the voters whose second preferences are likely to be 
critical are those of the third largest party, generally the Liberal Democrats in London. In 
1997 Liberal Democrat voters swung heavily to Labour at the second preference stage; in 
1992 while Liberal Democrat supporters nationally backed the Conservatives, they still gave 
most support to Labour in London, but not by a large margin. A second critical group in a 
finely balanced AV election are the ‘Other’ voters who backed such parties as the Greens, the 
Referendum party (in 1997), small socialist parties, the BNP, etc. 
 
2.16   We simulated how these preferences would have mapped out in a Mayoral election by 
looking at how our London respondents cast their second preferences, and then projecting the 
same total onto London’s voters as a whole - calculating their numbers from the first 
preference votes recorded under plurality rule in the Westminster constituencies. Table 2.3 
shows the outcomes. In 1997 Labour’s first preference vote was so close to a majority that  
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Table 2.2: How London respondents split their second preferences on the AV ballot, by 
first preference parties, 1997 and 1992 
 
First party supported: 
1997 general election 
Second party supported: 
Con Lab Lib Dem 
Conservative      -      7        12 
Labour    29      -        49 
Liberal Dem    33    49         - 
Green      2      6        21 
Other      5      3          3 
None    31     35        14 
Total 100% 100%      100% 
 
N = 
 
158 
 
353 
 
89 
1992 general election    
Conservative     -      9        26 
Labour      7      -        33 
Liberal Dem    54   48  
- 
Green      8    17       22 
Other      0      0         0 
None    31    26       19 
Total 100% 100%     100% 
 
N = 
 
382 
 
312 
 
127 
 
redistributing the second preferences of ‘Other’ voters alone sufficed to give a tiny margin of 
victory, without Liberal Democrat voters’ second preferences coming into play. The result 
would have been a rather narrow mandate for the Mayor, with just over 51 per cent support. 
In 1992 redistributing the ‘Other’ vote did not suffice to produce a majority winner, so that 
the Liberal Democrat votes would have been eliminated from the bottom. Their redistributed 
second preferences would have produced a clear Conservative victory over Labour, with the  
  
Table 2.3: Alternative Vote outcomes in an at-large London election, 1997 and 1992 
 
1997 votes 
 
Conservative 
 
Labour 
 
Lib Democrat 
 
Other 
 
First preferences 
 
1,036,175 
 
1,643,333 
 
486,013 
 
156,067 
 
Redistribute ‘Other’ votes 
 
1,082,995 
 
1,700,610 
 
512,076 
 
- 
 
1997 vote shares (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First preferences 
 
31.2 
 
49.5 
 
14.6 
 
4.7 
 
Redistribute ‘Other’ votes 
 
32.9 
 
51.6 
 
15.5 
 
- 
 
1992 votes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First preferences 
 
1,630,546 
 
1,332,821 
 
542,733 
 
89,497 
 
Redistribute ‘Other’ votes 
 
1,657,395 
 
1,332,838 
 
542,739 
 
- 
 
Redistribute Lib Dem votes 
 
1,796,878 
 
1,513,568 
 
- 
 
- 
 
1992 vote shares (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First preferences 
 
45.3 
 
37.1 
 
15.1 
 
2.5 
 
Redistribute ‘Other’ votes 
 
46.9 
 
37.7 
 
15.4 
 
- 
 
Redistribute Lib Dem votes 
 
54.3 
 
45.7 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Note: Since these simulations relied on survey data we had to redistribute the ‘Other’ vote as a whole, rather 
than separately for each of the parties involved in order of their votes (since we did not have survey data on how 
each party’s supporters cast their second preferences). Consequently the margin of victory in 1997 might well 
have been less than shown. In 1992 this problem would not have affected the results. 
  
 
first preferences) than five years earlier when the Conservatives fell well short of an initial 
majority. This apparently perverse result is a significant by-product of the AV elimination 
method, and given the historic Conservative and Labour vote shares in London, and the 
tendency for ‘other’ votes to grow in numbers, the situation could easily recur in the future. 
 
 
 12 
2.17     There are a number of well-known criticisms of AV as a system. One is that under 
AV voter A’s tenth or eleventh preference will count in determining the final result just as 
much as voter B’s first preference or voter C’s second preference: but we do not think of first 
preferences and tenth preferences as being of equivalent weight. This potential problem 
becomes greater the larger the number of parties or candidates in competition, the more 
evenly support is distributed amongst them, and the more preferences that voters indicate. 
 
2.18   A second criticism is that the step-by-step method of eliminating candidates from the 
bottom can produce strong effects in itself where there are more than four candidates in 
competition. Consider the following hypothetical example of rounds of an AV count, where 
the vote numbers are shown, and a * indicates the candidate eliminated (with their second or 
subsequent preferences redistributed to give the next round’s voting figures): 
1st round 2nd round 3rd round  4th round 
Conservative  110     115    115*    
Labour    120     125    140   140 
Liberal Democrat   90     105    120   230 
Green      30       30* 
Independent    25* 
  
 
Here the third placed candidate in the first round (the Liberal Democrat in our example) picks 
up the most second and third preference support from voters for the fourth- and fifth-placed 
candidates (the Greens and Independent) when they are eliminated. Labour was in the lead on 
the first, second and third rounds, but the Liberal Democrat  just edges ahead of the Tory 
candidate in the third round, who is eliminated. In the run-off fourth round, virtually all 
Conservative supporters transfer to the Liberal Democrat - who then wins easily over Labour. 
Some observers find the possibility of such a sequence disturbing, arguing that citizens will 
find it hard to understand how Labour could have been in the lead on three rounds but then 
lose to the initially third-placed candidate. In general the more numerous the candidates in an 
AV election, the greater the likelihood that potentially troubling effects of this kind will 
become apparent and influence the final result. 
 
 
THE SUPPLEMENTARY VOTE 
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2.19   The supplementary vote (SV) is a variant of AV which is designed to be simpler to 
operate, more transparent for voters and to meet some of the main criticisms of AV.  SV was 
recommended for adoption for House of Commons elections by the Labour Party’s Plant 
Report in 1992 and is under active consideration by the current Election Commission. Similar 
systems have been used in a number of smaller liberal democracies, (for example, for 
electing the President of Sri Lanka) but not in larger western countries.  
 
2.20   The SV method preserves ‘X’ voting, but adapts it in a minimal way. Voters can mark  
preferences with an X in two columns next to the candidate and party names. Figure 2 shows 
an SV ballot paper used in our 1997 survey. With their first preference people can express 
support for any party or candidate they find most appealing, contributing to their ‘headline’ 
total, even if that candidate has little effective chance of winning. Then with their second 
preference voters can seek to influence the final result of the election, deciding between the 
most likely candidates to stay in the second round.  
 
2.21   Counting is also simpler under SV. First preferences are counted and if one candidate 
gets over 50 per cent support they are elected straightaway; in this case the second preference 
votes are not considered at all. However, if no one gets majority backing, the election moves 
to a second stage. Only the top two candidates can stay in the race. All the candidates placed 
third, fourth, fifth (and so on) are eliminated at the same time. Their supporters’ ballot papers 
are inspected to see if they show any second preferences for candidates still in the race, and 
those that do are transferred to the appropriate pile of votes. If a second preference is for a 
candidate who has already been eliminated, then the ballot paper is discarded, and plays no 
further part in the election. At the end of the second stage then, the top two candidates A and 
B have enhanced piles of votes comprising their first preference supporters plus ballot papers 
from eliminated candidates who gave either A or B a second preference. Whoever’s pile of 
votes is the largest is now the winner. 
 
2.22   SV exponents claim that this approach is equivalent to holding a double ballot election 
on a single day. One main difference from a double ballot election is that under SV voters 
would have to rely on opinion polls instead of first-round election figures to judge which 
candidates were likely to be in the second round: if they make mistakes then the number of 
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‘wasted’ votes (second preferences given to candidates who do not make the second round) 
could be higher. And voters would have to decide individually how to cast their second 
preferences, without party leaders being able to do deals or forge alliances between the first 
and second rounds, advising their supporters how to vote. In addition critics argue that SV 
would ‘waste’ the votes of those who cast two votes for eliminated candidates, whereas their 
preferences could still play a part under AV, if they have filled in multiple preferences. 
 
2.23   Evidence from our surveys suggests that people cast their first and second preferences 
under SV in virtually identical fashion to their decisions under AV, as Table 2.4 shows: 
Table 2.4: How London respondents split their second preferences on the 
Supplementary Vote ballot, by first preference parties, 1997 
 
 
First party supported: 
1997 general election 
Second party supported: 
 
Con 
 
Lab 
 
Lib Dem 
Conservative      -      5        13 
Labour    18      -        48 
Liberal Democrats    45    59          - 
Other    14    13        23 
None    23    23        17 
 
Total 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
N = 
 
192 
 
337 
 
118 
 
The SV elimination method favours the existing major parties (Conservative and Labour), 
who will enter the second stage in most parts of the country. But the second preferences of 
Liberal Democrat and other voters will be critically important in determining the final result. 
 
2.24    The Supplementary Vote outcomes in London wide elections in 1997 and 1992 are 
shown in Table 2.5. We use the actual general election votes to indicate first preference 
support here. At the second stage the simultaneous elimination of both Liberal Democrat and  
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 Table 2.5: Supplementary Vote outcomes in an at-large London election, 1997 and 1992 
 
1997 votes 
 
Conservative 
 
Labour 
 
Lib Democrat 
 
Other 
 
First preferences 
 
1,036,175 
 
1,643,333 
 
486,013 
 
156,067 
 
Redistribute Lib Dem and 
Other votes 
 
1,144,719 
 
1,931,466 
 
- 
 
- 
 
1997 vote shares (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First preferences 
 
31.2 
 
49.5 
 
14.6 
 
4.7 
 
Redistribute Lib Dem and 
Other votes 
 
37.2 
 
62.8 
 
- 
 
- 
 
1992 votes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First preferences 
 
1,630,546 
 
1,332,821 
 
542,733 
 
89,497 
 
Redistribute Lib Dem and 
Other votes 
 
1,796,878 
 
1,513,568 
 
- 
 
- 
 
1992 vote shares (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First preferences 
 
45.3 
 
37.1 
 
15.1 
 
2.5 
 
Redistribute Lib Dem and 
Other votes 
 
54.3 
 
45.7 
 
- 
 
- 
 
all ‘other’ parties from the second round of SV would have produced a much more explicit 
majority for the winning Mayor in 1997. Labour’s strong showing on the first preference 
round would translate into a convincing final majority with almost two thirds share of the 
vote on the second round. By contrast,  we noted above that under AV the winning Mayor in 
1997 would have been elected on an apparently  tiny majority, with both Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats still being counted as ‘opposition’ voters. Under the 1992 conditions, 
however, the SV election produced a virtually identical result to AV under the 1992 
conditions, however. 
 
COPING WITH A MULTI-CANDIDATE ELECTION 
2.25   The two alternatives we have reviewed so far in a sense stand at opposite ends of the 
spectrum. Normal AV lies at one extreme, where voters can express as many preferences as 
there are candidates, and where vote-counting eliminates candidates sequentially from the 
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bottom. SV stands at the other pole, where voters can only express a maximum of two 
preferences, and where vote-counting goes straight to a run-off between the top two 
candidates if no one has an outright majority. In between there could be a range of other 
‘modified AV’ positions in which voters are allowed to express more than two preferences 
but fewer than the number of candidates. For instance, voters could be restricted to marking 
only  3, 4, or 5 preferences (or some higher fixed number), but in counting the votes we could 
retain the step-by-step elimination of candidates from the bottom which is characteristic of 
normal AV. Alternatively, systems closer to SV could be envisaged where voters would both 
be restricted to numbering only 3, 4 or 5 preferences, and at the second stage of counting the 
votes (if no one candidate has an outright majority) all but the top 3, 4 or 5 candidates would 
be eliminated at once. One could envisage a  system where voters could number up to three 
preferences, and if no one candidate has a majority then all but the top three candidates are 
eliminated at once. This approach might be seen as fairer to the Liberal Democrats than SV, 
by indicating to voters that their candidate for Mayor is likely to progress to the second round 
of vote counting, while yet encouraging voters to some degree to focus down on whom they 
would really like to see win the election. Such a system would be more complicated to 
explain to voters than SV, and if there were a strong independent candidate it could involve 
voters in making more difficult judgements about which candidates are likely to be in the top 
three. It would also entail shifting to numbering candidates in the Mayoral election, which 
seems to be less popular with British voters than X voting and which has important 
implications for the methods of election feasible for the Assembly (see Part 4 below). 
 
2.26   Our existing research into AV and SV in British parliamentary elections has 
demonstrated conclusively that whether we use AV or SV there are very small differences in 
outcomes, in that particular context of local constituency elections with a restricted candidate 
list. In that same context, any modified AV procedure would probably produce outcomes 
virtually identical to normal AV.  However, for the London Mayor elections we would expect 
candidate lists to be much more extended, with 4 or 5 candidates attracting significant vote 
shares, and their supporters’ second and subsequent preferences having an important 
influence upon the election results. In these circumstances the differences between AV and 
SV could become much more significant, since SV guarantees that only the top two 
candidates on the first round can emerge as a winner and restricts voters’ abilities to mark 
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preferences, while under AV a third-placed or even fourth-placed candidate on first 
preferences could conceivably win. Wherever AV and SV would operate  differently, 
modified AV procedures are likely to produce outcomes which lie between their two sets of 
outcomes. 
 
2.27    In general we would expect that the adoption of a full AV procedure will encourage a 
greater number of candidates to stand at the London Mayor election. The possibility of voters 
making multiple transfers of preferences will encourage ‘independent’ candidatures from 
people who are disappointed in their search for the official endorsement of their party. The 
possibility under AV that a third or fourth placed candidate might eventually win could 
dramatically lower the threshold which independent candidates need to surmount to do well. 
If they can run ahead of their party’s official candidate at some stage they could hope for 
them to be eliminated and to pick up most of their supporters. They can also hope to pick up 
second or subsequent preferences from party B or C voters, but yet can demonstrate a degree 
of party loyalty to party A by urging their supporters to cast a second preference for the 
official A candidate (which they hope will not be activated). 
 
2.28   By contrast, an SV election would create much stronger incentives for disappointed 
Mayoral candidates to stick by their party and back the official candidate, since only the top 
two people can stay in the race at the second stage. Without multiple transfers of third or 
subsequent preferences being feasible, SV would create a stronger premium on party loyalty, 
and tend to keep the number of candidates for Mayor down to a manageable number. SV 
would also guarantee that a candidate who was low-ranked on first preferences could never 
emerge as an eventual winner. SV would tend to advantage the existing major parties 
(Conservatives and Labour), unless the Liberal Democrats or a fourth party were to acquire a 
candidate with exceptional popular appeal. Run-offs between Conservative and Labour 
candidates would also tend to increase the chances of the same party controlling the Mayor’s 
position and the Assembly. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
2.29   The London Mayor election will be a unique, at-large election which is likely to attract 
a high number of candidates. Double ballot voting is not likely to be a viable or successful 
option under British conditions, and plurality rule elections could produce winners with only 
low levels of support in multi-candidate elections. The two majoritarian systems AV or SV 
have not been used for such an election before, but both look viable possibilities. They are 
more likely to produce a result which commands widespread acceptance. Both would 
produce highly similar outcomes under the 1997 and 1992 general election voting patterns 
and assuming only a restricted numbers of candidates. But SV would have guaranteed a large 
visible majority for the Mayor in 1997 whereas AV would have produced an apparently tiny  
majority in that year. SV is also simpler for voters to operate and to understand the counting 
procedure, and it is more likely to discourage the proliferation of large numbers of 
candidates, whereas AV could tend to encourage it. It is important that the Mayoral election 
system is easily understood; that the winning candidate has visible majority support; and that 
voters do not confront a choice of baffling complexity (produced by a very large number of 
candidates). Hence we recommend that the Supplementary Vote would be the most 
appropriate system for the London Mayor elections.  If an Alternative Vote system was none 
the less adopted, we would strongly recommend using a ‘modified AV’ approach, restricting 
the number of preferences expressed to 3, 4 or 5 choices (see paragraphs 2.25-2.26). 
 
Part 3:  
 
ELECTING THE LONDON ASSEMBLY 
 
 
 
3.1   We begin by reviewing some important design constraints which will influence how any 
electoral system for the London Assembly will work. We then look at five systems in turn, 
which might be used:  
•  Plurality rule;  
• A ‘classic’ version of the additional member system, with local constituencies and 
     sub-regional top-up seats;   
•  A ‘London-wide’ version of the additional member system, with local 
constituencies 
as before but with top-up seats allocated on a London-wide basis;  
•  List proportional representation; and  
•  The single transferable vote. 
 
 
DESIGN CONSTRAINTS 
3.2    A key first factor to consider is the size of the Assembly, specified in the Green Paper 
as between 24 and 32 members. But 
- in an Assembly of 25 seats each transfer of a seat from one party to another is a 
shift of 4 per cent; so that close to break points a shift of a fraction of 1 per cent in 
votes will trigger a shift of 4 per cent of seats; 
- in an Assembly of 33 seats the equivalent figure for seats shifts is 3 per cent. 
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To judge the significance of Assembly size here, bear in mind that in the 659 seat House of 
Commons each shift of seats between the parties affects only 0.15 of one percent of the total. 
Thus no fine-grain matching of parties’ seats shares to their vote shares will be feasible in 
London. The Assembly will inherently be somewhat more disproportional than larger elected 
bodies. 
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3.3   Relationships between electors and their representatives will also differ significantly 
from other elected bodies. Local councillors have wards of around 3,600 people in London 
boroughs. And MPs have constituencies of 80,000 people. But with a population of 6.9 
million in London there will be: 
-  288,000 people per member of  a 24 seat Assembly; and 
-  216,000 people per member of a 32 seat Assembly. 
Even if the whole Assembly was to be elected in single-member districts, the links between 
Assembly representatives and their constituencies would be much more difficult to build up 
than in the case of either MPs or councillors. Constituency accountability in the London 
Assembly is thus likely to be unusually weak by British standards, whatever scheme of 
election is devised. 
 
3.4   In addition the Green Paper makes it clear that it is not intended to repeat the experience 
of the GLC, when boroughs were used as GLC constituencies, producing a very localist 
pattern of interest in metropolitan issues (often termed ‘borough-itis’) that was inimical to the 
formation of a consensus on strategic issues. Avoiding borough-itis implies that the 
Assembly constituencies should not be patterned on a single borough, which would anyway 
be impossible if the Assembly size was below 32 seats. 
 
3.5   To achieve proportionality between seats and votes shares in electing the Assembly 
imposes another constraint.  Alternative systems to plurality rule require multi-member 
constituencies. It is generally accepted in political science that for an electoral system to have 
a chance of regularly delivering proportional results, the number of seats per constituency 
(termed the ‘district magnitude’) must be at least four. Schemas with only two or three seats 
per election district are bound to confront difficulties in accurately matching parties’ seats to 
their votes. (And of course single-member constituency systems make no attempt to match 
overall seat shares to vote shares). 
 
3.6   The normal measure of how proportionally an electoral system works for choosing a 
legislature is called ‘deviation from proportionality’ (the DV score). This index is calculated 
by subtracting each party’s vote share from their seat share; adding up these deviations for all 
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parties (without taking notice of + or - signs); and then dividing by two. The resulting index 
shows the percentage of representatives holding seats which are not justified in terms of their 
parties’ shares of the overall vote. The DV score would be zero in a perfectly proportional 
electoral system, but this level is not practically attainable in a working electoral system. In 
most liberal democracies we would term a system ‘proportional’ if it produced outcomes with 
DV scores varying between four and eight. Given the difficulties of achieving proportionality 
with a small London Assembly, then a system would be performing reasonably 
proportionately if it regularly obtained DV scores of between 5 and 10 per cent. We use this 
criterion below. 
 
3.7    A final limitation of our analysis should be mentioned explicitly at the start. In an 
Assembly of between 24 and 32 members it may be quite a hard task to devise a pattern of 
seats (especially multi-member seats) which respects existing boundaries and areas and yet 
also matches very closely with the distribution of population. The task of drawing up election 
district boundaries for the Assembly will be a reasonably complex one for the Boundary 
Commission to undertake. Our aim in this study is do no more than explore some indicative 
schemas as the basis for simulations. The election district areas considered below are rough 
and ready creations. All of them have had to be composed by putting together existing 
Westminster constituencies, because we have no general election data on any other basis, and 
without this data we cannot conduct simulations. Each of our schemas consequently has some 
problems of ‘malapportionment’, a mismatch between the population in different areas and 
the Assembly seats in those areas - problems which a final schema drawn up by the Boundary 
Commission may well be able to reduce. It is important to bear in mind that where 
malapportionment occurs it will increase the DV scores: hence in what follows comparisons 
of DV scores are only valid within any given constituency schema, and not between schemas. 
 
 
 
 PLURALITY RULE 
3.8   Using plurality rule elections with single member districts for a 32 seat Assembly would 
almost certainly entail recreating borough-based constituencies, which we have noted was not 
seen as desirable in the Green Paper. We present an analysis here primarily for the purpose of 
seeing how alternative systems would operate compared with plurality rule.  Single borough 
constituencies would not give a very close fit between seats and population, but might be 
justified on other grounds - for example, equal representation of borough interests. We can 
model such a schema easily using the 1997 general election results aggregated up to a 
borough level, shown in Table 3.1. A striking feature is that in 1992 the Liberal Democrats 
would have secured no seats on over 15 per cent of the vote, and the Conservatives would 
have gained a near two thirds majority on the basis of 45 per cent of the vote. In 1997 
Labour’s near majority in popular votes would have been converted into a dominant position 
in the Assembly, with over four fifths of the seats: both the Conservatives and the Liberal 
Democrats would have been greatly under-represented.  The DV score would be 35, which is 
amongst the highest scores that a voting system could achieve and yet still be part of a liberal 
democracy. To compare, suppose that Labour on 49.5 per cent of the vote won all the 
Assembly seats - the DV score then would be 50. The 1997 result is seven tenths of the way 
to this effective maximum. There is ample evidence from existing local council elections that  
 
Table 3.1: Results for a 32 seat London Assembly elected using plurality rule, 1997 and  
              1992 
 
 
 
Con 
 
Lab 
 
Lib Dem 
 
Other 
 
1997: Assembly seats 
 
2 
 
27 
 
3 
 
0 
 
          % share of seats 
 
6.3 
 
84.4 
 
9.4 
 
0 
 
          % share of votes 
 
31.2 
 
49.5 
 
14.6 
 
4.7 
 
1992: Assembly seats 
 
20 
 
12 
 
0 
 
0 
 
          % share of seats 
 
62.5 
 
37.5 
 
0 
 
0 
 
          % share of votes 
 
45.3 
 
37.001 
 
15.1 
 
2.5 
 
1997 DV score  = 34.9     1992 DV score  = 17.6 
  
 
the creation of effectively one-party councils is bad for the public legitimacy of such bodies, 
and is unlikely to encourage good governance. 
 
3.9   We cannot model plurality rule elections for a smaller Assembly with only 24 seats, 
since we cannot recombine seats except in Westminster constituencies. However, we can be 
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confident that it would show somewhat higher DV scores than Table 3.1 in both years. There 
are other options for plurality rule, including creating even larger constituencies to elect two 
members - similar to some existing multi-member council wards in local government where 
voters get two or three votes. But they would simply strengthen the patterns already shown in 
Table 3.1: for instance, in 1992 a 16 constituency schema for the Assembly with two 
members elected per constituency would have meant that the Conservatives won 22 seats and 
Labour only 10, pushing the DV score above  23 points. 
 
3.10    Apart from the high levels of disproportionality in an Assembly elected under plurality 
rule, there would be problems on other grounds. ‘Borough-itis’ could return as a major 
problem in any system where Assembly constituencies used borough boundaries. Plurality 
rule elections provide no protection for political minorities - the Liberal Democrats’ under-
representation would be striking, creating legitimacy problems for the Assembly. The 
elections for Mayor and for the Assembly used plurality rule, they would almost invariably 
be won by the leading party in each election year. This effect might make Mayor-Assembly 
relations more smooth-running, but it would make a nonsense of the idea that the Assembly 
could serve as any form of check or balance on the Mayor - since the Mayor’s party would 
typically have a large artificial majority in the Assembly produced by the electoral system. 
And plurality rule systems have confronted acute problems in producing legislatures which 
are socially representative, accurately reflecting the characteristics of the electorate. Women 
have historically been, and continue to be, greatly under-represented in plurality rule 
legislatures, as have ethnic minorities. The strong swings shown in Table 3.1 would tend to 
be reflected in large-scale shifts in the social composition of the Assembly which could be 
unhelpful for its legitimacy. For all these reasons a plurality rule schema of election would 
not seem to provide a sound foundation for a new Assembly. 
 
3.11   It would also be feasible to use an SV or an AV approach to elect the Assembly. Either 
system would have the effect of ensuring that representatives commanded the support of a 
majority of their local constituents, instead of just a plurality. However, the problems of the 
constituency basis inducing ‘borough-itis’ and of the system not being socially representative 
would remain. Nor would the use of AV or SV make any significant improvement in the 
proportionality of the results. In 1992 the Conservative majority might have been cut back 
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very slightly, so that the DV score dropped a little. But in 1997 the tide of public opinion 
flowing against the Conservatives would have produced markedly less proportional results 
than the data shown in Table 3.1. For these reasons we have not further explored the use of 
AV or SV for electing the Assembly. Instead we turn to look at three different proportional 
systems. 
 
 
THE ADDITIONAL MEMBER SYSTEM: CLASSIC APPROACH 
3.12   This approach would involve electing half or more of representatives locally using 
plurality rule elections as now; and choosing the remainder of the Assembly members within 
‘sub-regions’ of London, where parties’ shares of seats would be ‘topped up’ to bring them 
into line with their share of votes. Thus a party with 30 per cent of the vote, which had 
already won 30 per cent or more of the  seats in a sector or sub-region of London  would get 
no top-up seats; while a party which had piled up a lot of votes coming second or third in 
local constituencies in the sector, without winning in any of them, would be compensated 
with some ‘top-up’ representatives. The outcome should thus be an Assembly where half or 
more of representatives were elected in single member constituencies, but where each party’s 
share of seats matches its vote share and deviation from proportionality is hence very low. A 
version of this approach is to be used to elect both the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh 
Assembly. Both schemes involve electing a large majority of representatives from local 
constituencies using plurality rule, but with ‘top-up’ members elected at the  level of Euro-
constituencies to give a more proportional outcome. 
 
3.13    For London one simple way of implementing this approach for a 32 seat Assembly 
would be to elect local members in perhaps 16 constituencies (each covering two London 
boroughs), with the remaining 16 ‘additional’ members elected at an ‘upper’ level. For 
London, the city as a whole could be the top-up district, but we consider this possibility in the 
next section (4). The remaining possibilities for the the upper level areas could cover a very 
wide range, including: 
-  north of the Thames and south could be two top-up districts; 
-  the capital could be divided into quadrants, north and south of the river, and east 
and west; 
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-  the six partnership areas used in the Green paper could be used;  
-  a five-constituency system could be designed intermediate between the last two 
options, retaining much of the quadrants design but adding in  a separate 
constituency for central London as well; or 
-  Euro-constituencies could be used as top-up areas, as suggested by the London 
borough chief executives in their response to the Green Paper. 
Within the available time and resources we have chosen to explore the quadrants solution, the 
six partnership areas, and a possible intermediate five-constituency schema.  
 
3.13 There are a number of advantages to splitting up London into four, five or six areas for 
the purpose of allocating top-up seats. Using larger areas such as London as a whole would 
confront voters with considerable difficulties in knowing who was on the parties’ top-up lists. 
With 16 top-up seats and 4 parties, for example, they would have to try to acquire 
information on at least 64 different candidates in addition to the candidates in their local 
constituency. There is considerable evidence that north and south London, and east and west 
London are different sub-regions, with distinctive social characters, and confronting some 
significantly different problems.  AMS can also be most usefully compared with the other 
proportional systems (STV and list PR) if we examined top-up areas most like the multi-
member constituencies used in these systems. Finally, there are considerable possible 
advantages to choosing an AMS system for London which will work on the same lines as the 
AMS systems to be used for Scotland and Wales. It will be easier to explain the new system 
to the public if it forms part of a more general pattern and is not sui generis. At a detailed 
level we also assume in our central projections that the method  used for allocating top-up 
seats will be the so-called d’Hondt formula. (This  method has been explicitly signalled in the 
Wales white paper, seems to be implied for Scotland and has also been adopted by the Home 
Office in its plans for introducing list PR in the 1999 Euro-elections). However, we also 
consider below the implications of using different formulae to allocate AMS top-up seats. 
 
3.14    The most common version of AMS asks people to vote twice on the same ballot paper, 
first by marking an X for a candidate (representing a party) to become the local 
representative; and then by marking a second X for a party to win top-up seats at the upper or 
regional level. Our 1997 and 1992 surveys both used a two-vote ballot paper shown in Figure 
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3. Note that at the regional level, respondents were choosing only between the names of 
parties, without candidate names. In both years between 82 and 89 per cent of people chose 
the same party at constituency level as their general election vote. The main differences were 
that 1 in every 16 Tory and Labour voters now backed a Liberal Democrat, while 1 in 8 
Liberal Democrat voters switched to Labour. Rather more voters chose the Liberal 
Democrats as their constituency representative than support them for top-up seats, apparently 
reflecting a view that they are good at grass roots level but do not have strong policy 
positions in national politics. We use our London survey data to simulate how local and top-
up votes would have been cast by the whole electorate in the capital at the two general 
elections. 
 
3.15    To examine how the AMS election would turn out we first created 16 local 
constituency seats by pairing up boroughs, and then combining the 1997 and 1992 general 
election votes for constituencies in these areas. We tried to follow the ‘community’ criteria 
favoured by boundary commissions in Britain, and to create compact geographical areas; 
reflect social and economic linkages that already exist; put together areas which had a 
common social character; and in cases of doubt choose combinations which preserved the 
most pluralistic pattern of local constituency outcomes, rather than accentuating patterns of 
party predominance. There are several possible ways in which the boroughs might be paired 
up and still meet these criteria, however, and there is no perfect way of making a decision. 
(For example, there is a rationale for pairing up suburban boroughs in outer London with 
each other, for they are often most alike in their social character. But there is also a rationale 
for pairing up suburban boroughs with their neighbours in inner London: they depend on the 
same radial road, rail and tube links, and ‘pie slice’ constituencies might do more to 
discourage overly parochial approaches to London’s problems). We envisage that a process 
of detailed design of constituency areas will have to be undertaken by a body such as the 
Local Government Commission or the Boundary Commission after due consultation, using 
regulations included in the statute which creates the Greater London Authority. Hence we 
should stress that all the borough pairings included here are illustrative only: we hope that 
they will seem plausible and viable, but they are used only for simulation purposes. 
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3.16 For most of this section we used the pairings shown in borough groupings pattern 1, 
which is described in detail and shown in Map 4 in Appendix 2. From this pattern we were 
then able to group these local constituencies into the six partnership areas included in the 
Green paper, and allocated top-up seats in those areas. Later on we also used borough 
groupings pattern 1 as the basis for our quadrants scheme of top-up areas. However, we had 
to undertake some regrouping of the borough pairs in order to examine a five-constituency 
schema for top-up seats, and Map 5 in Appendix 2 also gives details of this alternative 
borough groupings pattern 2. Finally in the next section discussing a London-wide version of 
AMS, we made a number of further alterations to try and create more equally-sized local 
constituencies, and details of this schema (borough groupings pattern 3) are also given in 
Appendix 2 (Map 6). 
 
3.17 The six partnership areas were commended in the Green Paper as a possible sub-
regional constituency schema for London. However, because of very sharply unequal 
population sizes between partnership areas we had to move Croydon and Sutton from the 
South London Business partnership to the neighbouring South West London Leadership 
Forum; we also had to allocate one or two spare boroughs to partnerships (see Map 1). Table 
3.2 shows the results for both years. This AMS schema produces somewhat more 
proportional results than the plurality rule outcomes analysed above, but the number of top-
up seats per area is too small for an exact fit to be gained between parties’ votes shares and 
their seats. Thus in 1997 Labour would have achieved 59 per cent of seats on the basis of 49 
per cent of votes, and in 1992 Labour would have secured more seats than the Tories despite 
lagging behind them in their share of the  vote. In both years the Liberal Democrats would 
have been under-represented, and more 
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Table 3.2: Additional Member System results, using 16 local constituencies (pattern 1) 
and six partnership areas for allocating  top-up seats, 1997 and 1992 
 
 
1997 general election 
 
Con 
 
Lab 
 
Lib Dem 
 
Other 
 
East London Partnership:                  Votes % 
(6 seats)                                        Local seats 
                                                  Top-up seats 
 
23 
0 
1 
 
59 
3 
2 
 
10 
0 
0 
 
9 
0 
0 
 
Central London Partnership:             Votes % 
 (6 seats)                                       Local seats 
                                                 Top-up seats 
 
24 
0 
1 
 
56 
3 
1 
 
16 
0 
1 
 
4 
0 
0 
 
West London Leadership:                 Votes % 
(6 seats)                                        Local seats 
                                                 Top-up seats 
 
33 
0 
2 
 
53 
3 
1 
 
10 
0 
0 
 
4 
0 
0 
 
North London Leadership:               Votes % 
(4 seats)                                        Local seats 
                                                  Top-up seats 
 
36 
0 
2 
 
50 
2 
0 
 
11 
0 
0 
 
3 
0 
0 
 
South London Business                     Votes % 
Leadership, excl Croydon              Local seats 
& Sutton (4 seats)                       Top-up seats 
 
33 
1 
1 
 
45 
1 
1 
 
16 
0 
0 
 
6 
0 
0 
 
SW London Leadership                     Votes % 
Forum, plus Croydon                     Local seats 
& Sutton (6 seats)                       Top-up seats 
 
36 
1 
2 
 
36 
1 
1 
 
24 
1 
0 
 
4 
0 
0 
 
1997 Across London                       Votes % 
 (32 seats)                                    Local seats 
                                                  Top-up seats 
                                                     Total seats 
DV score = 13                               % of seats 
 
31 
 2 
 9 
11 
34 
 
49 
13 
  6 
19 
59 
 
15 
 1 
 1 
 2 
 6 
 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
1992 general election 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
East London Partnership:                  Votes % 
(6 seats)                                        Local seats 
                                                  Top-up seats 
 
37 
1 
1 
 
48 
2 
1 
 
14 
0 
1 
 
2 
0 
0 
 
Central London Partnership:             Votes % 
 (6 seats)                                       Local seats 
                                                 Top-up seats 
 
37 
1 
1 
 
45 
2 
1 
 
16 
0 
1 
 
2 
0 
0 
 
West London Leadership:                 Votes % 
(6 seats)                                        Local seats 
                                                 Top-up seats 
 
48 
3 
0 
 
39 
0 
3 
 
12 
0 
0 
 
2 
0 
0 
 
 30 
 
 
North London Leadership:               Votes % 
(4 seats)                                        Local seats 
                                                  Top-up seats 
 
51 
2 
0 
 
35 
0 
2 
 
13 
0 
0 
 
1 
0 
0 
 
South London Business                     Votes % 
Leadership, excl Croydon              Local seats 
& Sutton (4 seats)                       Top-up seats 
 
47 
1 
1 
 
33 
1 
1 
 
14 
0 
0 
 
6 
0 
0 
 
SW London Leadership                     Votes % 
Forum, plus Croydon                     Local seats 
& Sutton (6 seats)                       Top-up seats 
 
51 
3 
0 
 
27 
0 
2 
 
21 
0 
1 
 
1 
0 
0 
 
1992 Across London                       Votes % 
 (32 seats)                                    Local seats 
                                                  Top-up seats 
                                                     Total seats 
DV score = 10                               % of seats 
 
44 
11 
  3 
14 
44 
 
37 
  5 
 10  
15 
49 
 
15 
 1 
 1 
 3 
 9 
 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
severely in 1997. As with almost any proportional representation system, the ‘other’ votes 
would have secured no seats in either year. The end result is that the DV score in 1997 would 
be 13, above the range of 5 to 10 which we could regard as proportional, while in 1992 the 
score would only just have been inside this level.  These scores are better than those achieved 
with plurality rule, but they are unusually high for an AMS system. 
 
3.18    One of the reasons for these relatively high AMS disproportionality scores is that the 
partnership area boundaries do not match seats to population very well. Another influence is 
that the top-up areas are too small and have too few additional seats to compensate for party 
over-representation as a result of the local seats outcomes, especially in 1997 when Labour 
swept the board. But even in that year Labour would have won 6 more top-up seats to add to 
its 13 victories out of 16 local seats. We wondered if the d’Hondt formula for allocating seats 
between the parties was the culprit here, and compared this method of allocating seats with 
two other widely used methods. The differences between rules may seem esoteric, but they 
are important in AMS and in list PR systems. The d’Hondt method works by dividing each 
party’s vote total by the number of its existing seats +1, so that whichever party has the 
largest figure of unrewarded votes here gets the next additional member. This procedure 
generally favours large parties over small parties. Other methods work by setting a ‘quota’ of 
votes a party needs to get a seat, and then subtracting this quota each time the party is 
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awarded a seat - again whichever  party has the largest unrecognized votes should then have 
the next seat. Appendix 3 gives a full explanation of two different subtracting formulae used 
here, the Hare formula and the Droop formula. 
 
3.19    Table 3.3 shows the results of this investigation, and confirm that within this 
constituency schema the d’Hondt formula is a primary cause of disproportionality. In 1997 
the Liberal Democrats would have gained 6 or 7 seats with the alternative formulae at  
Table 3.3: Comparing parties’ seats under different formulae for the AMS partnership 
      schema (16 local constituencies and 6 partnership areas for top-up seats), 
     1997 and 1992 
 
 
 
 
Con seats 
 
Lab 
seats 
 
Lib Dem 
seats 
 
Other 
seats 
 
DV score
 
1997:        d’Hondt 
 
11 
 
19 
 
2 
 
0 
 
13 
 
                      Hare 
 
9 
 
16 
 
7 
 
0 
 
8 
 
                    Droop 
 
9 
 
18 
 
5 
 
0 
 
8 
 
1992:        d’Hondt 
 
14 
 
15 
 
3 
 
0 
 
10 
 
                      Hare 
 
14 
 
12 
 
6 
 
0 
 
4 
 
                    Droop 
 
14 
 
13 
 
5 
 
0 
 
4 
 
Labour’s expense, but under d’Hondt they only got 2 seats. In 1992 d’Hondt would have 
delivered more seats to Labour than the Conservatives and only 3 seats to the Liberal 
Democrats, but the other formulae would give the Tories a clear lead and 5 or 6 Liberal 
Democrat seats.  The DV score on the other formulae would have been 8 in 1997, and 4 in 
1992 - comfortably within the range we would expect of a proportional system. 
 
3.20   We next looked to see if choosing fewer and bigger top-up areas would help the AMS 
method to function more proportionately. Here we retained the 16 double-borough local seats 
already defined, but we divided London into four pie-slice quadrants for the purpose of 
distributing top up seats (see Map 2). These upper level boundaries define basically north 
west, north east, south west, and south east shapes, with divisions running radially out from 
the centre into the suburbs. The quadrant areas resemble the radical slices suggested by the 
London borough chief executives in their response to the Green Paper. Appendix 2 provides 
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a full listing of how boroughs (and their component Westminster constituencies) were 
grouped in the quadrants schema. Table 3.4 shows the results. 
 
3.21   Table 3.4 shows that the AMS system was much more successfully implemented in the 
quadrants schema. The DV scores were much lower than with the partnerships scheme, only 
7 points in 1997 and 5 in 1992, even using the d’Hondt rule to allocate seats. In 1997 Labour 
would have enjoyed a small seats bonus, mainly because of the exclusion of the ‘Other’ vote 
from winning seats. In 1992 the system would also have been well-behaved, giving the 
Conservatives sufficient seats, although even here Labour would have been somewhat over-
represented. The Liberal Democrats would also have fared much better under the quadrants 
schema, winning 4 out of the Assembly’s 32 seats in both years. 
 
3.22 We repeated our test of the different formulae with the quadrants schema for top-up 
seats, and discovered that for the 1992 election all the Hare and Droop formulae produced  
Table 3.4: Additional Member System results, using 16 local constituencies and four 
      quadrant areas for allocating  top-up seats, 1997 and 1992 
 
 
1997 general election 
 
Con 
 
Lab 
 
Lib Dem 
 
Other 
 
North East quadrant      :                  Votes % 
(8 seats)                                        Local seats 
                                                  Top-up seats 
 
26 
0 
2 
 
57 
4 
1 
 
10 
0 
1 
 
7 
0 
0 
 
North West quadrant:                         Votes % 
 (12 seats)                                      Local seats 
                                                 Top-up seats 
 
33 
1 
3 
 
52 
5 
2 
 
11 
0 
1 
 
4 
0 
0 
 
South East quadrant:                        Votes % 
(6 seats)                                        Local seats 
                                                 Top-up seats 
 
28 
1 
1 
 
49 
2 
1 
 
18 
0 
1 
 
5 
0 
0 
 
South West quadrant:                       Votes % 
(6 seats)                                        Local seats 
                                                  Top-up seats 
 
36 
1 
2 
 
36 
1 
1 
 
24 
1 
0 
 
4 
0 
0 
 
1997 Across London                       Votes % 
 (32 seats)                                    Local seats 
                                                  Top-up seats 
                                                     Total seats 
DV score = 7                                 % of seats 
 
32 
 3 
 8 
11 
34 
 
49 
12 
 5 
17 
53 
 
15 
 1 
 3 
 4 
 13 
 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
1992 general election 
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North East quadrant      :                  Votes % 
(8 seats)                                        Local seats 
                                                  Top-up seats 
 
40 
2 
1 
 
44  
2 
2 
 
14 
0 
1 
 
2 
0 
0 
 
North West quadrant:                         Votes % 
 (12 seats)                                      Local seats 
                                                 Top-up seats 
 
48 
5 
1 
 
38 
1 
4 
 
12 
0 
1 
 
2 
0 
0 
 
South East quadrant:                        Votes % 
(6 seats)                                        Local seats 
                                                 Top-up seats 
 
42 
1 
2 
 
38 
2 
0 
 
16 
0 
1 
 
5 
0 
0 
 
South West quadrant:                       Votes % 
(6 seats)                                        Local seats 
                                                  Top-up seats 
 
51 
3 
0 
 
27 
0 
2 
 
21 
0 
1 
 
1 
0 
0 
 
1992 Across London                       Votes % 
 (32 seats)                                    Local seats 
                                                  Top-up seats 
                                                     Total seats 
DV score = 5                                % of seats 
 
45 
11 
 4 
15 
47 
 
37 
  5 
 8 
13 
41 
 
15 
 0 
 4 
 4 
 13 
 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
exactly the same results as the d’Hondt schema in terms of the total seats won by each party. 
In 1997 Table 3.5 shows that the d’Hondt formula was the slightly less proportional in its 
effects than the Droop quota. The Hare formula produced a highly proportional outcome: but 
the seat awarded to ‘Other’ voters here is a little illusory, however, since in practice these 
voters are not a single group but have loyalties split amongst many separate parties. 
Table 3.5: Comparing outcomes with different formulae for the AMS quadrants 
      schema (16 local constituencies and 4 quadrant areas for top-up seats)       
       1997 
 
 
 
 
Con seats 
 
Lab seats 
 
Lib Dem 
seats 
 
Other 
seats 
 
DV score
 
1997:    d’Hondt 
 
11 
 
17 
 
4 
 
0 
 
7 
 
                  Hare 
 
10 
 
16 
 
5 
 
1 
 
2 
 
                Droop 
 
10 
 
17 
 
5 
 
0 
 
5 
 
1992 All formulae 
 
15 
 
13 
 
4 
 
0 
 
5 
 
 
3.23   The advantages of the AMS system compared with other methods for securing 
proportional representation all revolve around the maintenance of some form of constituency 
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link. Even so the AMS local seats would be large areas, spanning across two London 
boroughs and with an average population of 432,000 people. Successful candidates who 
stood in areas of this size would not be prone to ‘borough-itis’ and would need to work hard 
to establish their identity with voters, as the experience of Euro MPs demonstrates. But there 
is a reasonable prospect that they could do so once the Assembly began operating with its 
small membership of 32, especially if it sought to tackle key  metropolitan issues in an 
imaginative way. Voters would have more difficulties in assessing the party lists from which 
top-up members would be chosen. In the partnerships areas schema the number of additional 
members would be smaller, with each party offering a list of only two or three candidates - 
probably selected wholly or in the main from that party’s candidates for the local seats. In the 
quadrants schema voters would have rather longer party lists to consider, of between 3 and 6 
names, but again they are most likely to come from each party’s candidates for the local 
Assembly seats. The quadrants schema would place a premium on parties finding candidates 
who could successfully bridge across the often perceived divide between inner and outer 
London, between the inner city and the London suburbs - an imperative which might be 
helpful in creating an Assembly where representatives adopt a more strategic view of London 
issues. 
 
3.24 Finally we examined an intermediate solution between the six partnership areas and the 
quadrants schema, namely an arrangement of five areas which separates out a substantial 
central London area from the quadrant schema. To create a suitable foundation for this new 
‘quintuple schema’, the pairings of London boroughs needed had to be altered from those 
used above in order to accommodate different top-up areas. In the new borough groupings 
pattern 2 (described in full and shown in Map 5 in Appendix 2) eight boroughs in the western 
area of London are paired with new partners in four AMS local seats as follows: 
Hammersmith with Wandsworth; Kingston with Merton; Hounslow with Richmond; and 
Ealing with Hillingdon. Outside the central area the boundaries of the quadrants schema are 
basically retained, except that the boundary between the North West and South West areas is 
adjusted so that Richmond is included in the North West. The major change  is that a large 
new central London top-up constituency is created covering eight boroughs - Camden, 
Islington, Hammersmith and Fulham, Kensington and Westminster (all taken from the North 
West quadrant); Lambeth and Southwark (taken from the south-east quadrant); and 
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Wandsworth (taken from the south-west quadrant). In addition the City is taken from the 
North East quadrant, although there is only a small electorate here. This central area has a 
compact boundary and covers most of the ‘core’ area of London. Map 3 shows the new top-
up areas which result. With an Assembly of 32 seats this arrangement would create 
constituencies with total seats as follows: North West 8 seats; North East 8 seats; Central 6 
seats; South West 4 seats; South East 4 seats. The top-up seats in each case are half of the 
total.  
 
 
3.25    Table 3.6 shows the basic results for this quintuple design, using the d’Hondt formula 
to allocate the top-up seats between the parties. In 1997 Labour would have gained a clear 
overall majority, and in 1992 the Conservatives and Labour would have tied on 14 seats each, 
despite the Tory lead in terms of votes. In both years the Liberal Democrats would have 
gained four seats. The DV scores across the two years were virtually identical, and at under 7 
per cent were in the middle of the 5 to 10 per cent range which we would regard as a 
proportional result. 
Table 3. 6: Additional Member System results, using 16 local constituencies (borough 
groupings pattern 2) and a quintuple  schema for allocating  top-up seats, 1997 
and 1992 
 
 
 
 
Cons 
seats 
 
Labour 
seats 
 
Lib Dem
seats 
 
Other 
seats 
 
Deviation from 
proportionality 
 
1997 election 
1992 election 
 
10 
14 
 
18 
14 
 
4 
4 
 
0 
0 
 
 6.8 
 6.7 
Notes: Table assumes a d’Hondt system. 
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3.26    Looking in more detail at these outcomes Table 3.7 shows the breakdown of local and 
top-up seats won by the parties using the 1997 and 1992 outcomes. In 1992 the Conservatives  
Table 3.7: Detailed results for the Additional Member System , using 16 local 
constituencies (borough groupings pattern 2) and  quintuple areas for allocating 
top-up seats, 1997 and 1992 
 
 
1997 general election 
 
Con 
 
Lab 
 
Lib Dem 
 
Other 
 
Central area                                         Local seats 
(8 seats)                                            Top-up seats 
 
0 
2 
 
4 
1 
 
0 
1 
 
0 
0 
 
North East quadrant                            Local seats 
(8 seats)                                           Top-up seats 
 
0 
2 
 
4 
1 
 
0 
1 
 
0 
0 
 
North West quadrant:                          Local seats 
 (8 seats)                                          Top-up seats 
 
0 
3 
 
4 
0 
 
0 
1 
 
0 
0 
 
South East quadrant:                          Local seats 
(6 seats)                                          Top-up seats 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
1 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
South West quadrant:                        Local seats 
(6 seats)                                          Top-up seats 
 
1 
0 
 
1 
1 
 
0 
1 
 
0 
0 
 
1997 Across London                          Votes % 
 (32 seats)                                        Local seats 
                                                     Top-up seats 
                                                        Total seats 
DV score = 7                                    % of seats 
 
32 
 2 
 8 
10 
31 
 
49 
14 
 4 
18 
56 
 
15 
 0 
 4 
 4 
 13 
 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
1992 general election 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Central area                                       Local seats 
(8 seats)                                           Top-up seats 
 
2 
1 
 
2 
2 
 
0 
1 
 
0 
0 
 
North East quadrant                           Local seats 
(8 seats)                                          Top-up seats 
 
2 
1 
 
2 
2 
 
0 
1 
 
0 
0 
 
North West quadrant:                         Local seats 
 (8 seats)                                          Top-up seats 
 
4 
0 
 
0 
3 
 
0 
1 
 
0 
0 
 
South East quadrant:                          Local seats 
(6 seats)                                          Top-up seats 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
1 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
South West quadrant:                         Local seats 
(6 seats)                                           Top-up seats 
 
2 
0 
 
0 
1 
 
0 
1 
 
0 
0 
 
1992 Across London                            Votes % 
 (32 seats)                                         Local seats 
                                                      Top-up seats 
                                                          Total seats 
DV score = 7                                     % of seats 
 
45 
11 
 3 
14 
44 
 
37 
  5 
  9 
14 
44 
 
15 
 0 
 4 
 4 
 13 
 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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In 1992 the Conservatives would have won two thirds of the 16 local seats, but in 1997 
Labour would have gained all but two. However, the top-up seats protect both the main 
parties - Labour would have gained over half of these seats in 1992 and the Tories exactly 
half of them in 1997. In both years the Liberal Democrats would have gained all their seats at 
the top-up stage. Across the two elections Labour would have been slightly over-represented 
in terms of its overall seats, the Conservatives would have been treated fairly and the Liberal 
Democrats very slightly under-represented. It seems that Labour would benefit most from the 
non-representation of the ‘other’ vote. 
 
THE ADDITIONAL MEMBER SYSTEM: A LONDON-WIDE APPROACH 
3.27   An alternative approach to setting up an AMS system in London would retain the mix 
of locally elected constituency representatives and top-up members, but would use the whole 
of London as the top-up constituency. There are a number of reasons why such a solution 
could be attractive: 
•  Using  a large London-wide area for allocating top-up seats means that it is easier 
to compensate for imbalances in the parties’ shares of local seats compared 
with their votes shares. Especially where there is a reasonably large number of 
top-up seats, such a  system could operate in a much more accurately 
proportional way. 
•  This advantage is especially great if the Assembly size is at the bottom of the range 
discussed in the Green Paper, with the number of representatives held to 24 
rather than the 32 seat Assembly considered so far. 
•  Using a London-wide constituency for allocating top-up seats could also encourage 
Assembly candidates to adopt more of a pan-London perspective in their 
campaigning, addressing major strategic issues and avoiding becoming too 
enmeshed in very local or borough-specific issues, which the Green Paper 
argues forcefully should not become the Assembly’s concerns. Assembly 
members successfully elected via this route would form a group amongst 
which political parties could look to recruit Mayoral candidates in the future. 
They would presumably be experienced in building up a London-wide 
reputation, linking up with functional groups (rather than just those which are 
geographically-based), and adopting a balanced view of strategic issues and 
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local concerns. These Assembly members might also be the most likely 
candidates amongst whom the Mayor might look for a Deputy Mayor, or for 
people to head up or participate in important commissions. The balance of 
locally-elected and London-wide members might prove productive in shaping 
the Assembly’s overall development, and might facilitate more effective 
relations between the Mayor and the Assembly. 
 
3.28   There are also a number of possible disadvantages of choosing top-up members across 
London as a whole. Depending on the number of top-up seats decided upon, voters could 
have to consider a very large number of names at the top-up stage. With a small Assembly of 
24 suggesting perhaps ten top-up seats, the ballot paper would have to include perhaps 40 or 
more names. (We assume that the three main parties will each put up a full slate of 
candidates. In theory it would rational for each party to field only enough candidates to cover 
the number of top-up seats they are likely to win, plus one. But parties will probably not field 
a shorter list in case it should be interpreted by the media and voters as them ‘giving up’ on 
winning some of the seats). With a larger Assembly of 32, there could be 16 London-wide 
top-up seats, and voters might have to grapple with over 60 candidates. Issues about the order 
in which parties arrange their candidates’ names may also become more salient under either 
of these scenarios. There may be more voter resistance, and more criticism by constitutional 
reform groups, if a closed list system is adopted for the London-wide top-up stage. Voters 
would then have only the option of choosing between the parties’ long lists (each considered 
as a bloc), without being able to alter the order in which candidates are elected from each list. 
On the other hand if an ‘open’ list system was adopted (with 40 to 60 names capable of being 
separately ticked), then the ballot paper could quickly become very complex and off-putting 
for voters. 
 
3.29   However, these potential difficulties can be at least partially addressed in several ways. 
Political parties may well choose their London-wide lists using an OMOV ballot of party 
members, just as they could choose between contending Mayoral candidates, and in this case 
the legitimacy of the lists would be much greater than if they are seen as devised by the party 
leadership or apparatus (see part 4). Problems of presenting longer lists of candidates in 
manageable and effective ways for voters could also be addressed by adopting more 
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innovative ways of designing ballot papers than the highly old-fashioned style so far adhered 
to by the Home Office in the UK. With a possible print run exceeding 4 million ballot papers, 
the top-up stage of a London-wide AMS ballot paper could be skilfully designed using colour 
printing, party logos, photographs of candidates and so on. With appropriate design effort 
either a closed list ballot could certainly be made easily understandable and accessible for 
voters. 
 
3.30   We therefore examined the use of a London-wide variant of AMS in the context of a 
smaller Assembly. A first step was to review whether the number of local constituencies 
could be reduced from the 16 envisaged in the previous section. Appendix 2 shows that on 
both the borough pattern 1 and 2 pairings of boroughs there are some considerable 
inequalities in the size of electorates for the local constituencies, reflecting the fact that 
London boroughs vary widely in size from the 232,000 electors in the largest borough 
(Ealing) to the 69,000 electors in the smallest borough (Westminster). Inherently any local 
constituency design must rely on amalgamations of the boroughs to create recognizable 
areas, and the only step feasible to cut local constituencies below 16 would be to create a few 
seats spanning three boroughs. Again there are a large number of possible designs which 
could be used, and we envisage that a body such as the Boundary Commission or the Local 
Government Commission would have to evaluate the available options.  
 
3.31   However, we have adopted one pattern for illustrative purposes. This arrangement is 
borough grouping pattern 3, shown in Map 6 and described in full in Appendix 2. It involves 
creating four three-borough seats, and rearranging the pairings of the remaining boroughs to 
try and reduce variations in the size of the local constituency electorates.2  Hence there would 
be 14 local seats. On the 1997 votes shares all but one of the local constituencies (Croydon 
and Sutton) would have been won by Labour. By contrast, on the 1992 votes shares all but 
three of the local constituencies would have been won by the Conservatives - the exceptions 
being Lambeth and Southwark; Tower Hamlets, Islington and Hackney; and Lambeth and 
Southwark. Thus on this pattern of boroughs, as with the others reviewed earlier, the leading 
party in each year will tend to sweep most of the board. 
 
2 The four three-borough seats are: Kingston, Merton and Wandsworth; Hammersmith, Kensington and 
Westminster; Barking, Havering and Newham; and Hackney, Islington and Tower Hamlets. 
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3.32   How well a London-wide top-up system could cope with these imbalances depends 
crucially on how many top-up seats there might be. The minimum size Assembly envisaged 
in the Green Paper is 24, implying at least 10 top-up seats, while presumably the maximum 
number of top-up seats would be 14 (the same as the local seats).3 However, to better show 
the importance of the number of top-up seats in equalizing outcomes Table 3.8 examines the 
outcomes which would have occurred in 1997 and 1992 with all the possible numbers of top- 
up seats between 5 and 14 (and so with the overall size of the Assembly varying between 19 
and 28 seats).  As with previous tables, the strong Labour lead in the 1997 general election 
voting poses a tougher problem for a London-wide system of top-ups than the closer Tory-
Labour competition in 1992. With between 5 and 9 top-up seats, a London-wide AMS system 
would not always operate proportionately - under 1997 conditions the system would have a 
DV score greater than 10 per cent. The main problems arise from the strong Labour lead in 
1997, which would have left both the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats under-
represented because there are insufficient top-up seats to rectify the anomalies.  
 
3.33   Table 3.8 shows that with nine top-up seats, if the ‘other’ votes cast in 1997 had all 
been for the same party, there would theoretically have been one ‘other’ seat in the 
Assembly. However, in practice the ‘other’ vote is divided between several different political 
parties, none of which would qualify for a seat on their own, and so from this point on we 
need to add approximately 2 per cent to the DV scores under 1997 conditions (reflecting the 
fact that 4.4 per cent of the vote will be effectively unrepresented). We present the table in 
this fashion only in order to dramatize the point that with a London-wide top-up 
constituency, any party which can win 5 per cent of the vote on its own will secure a seat at 
the top-up stage in an Assembly of 20 seats. This threshold drops to 4 per cent with an 
Assembly of 25 seats. 
Table 3.8: Additional Member System results, using 14 local constituencies (borough 
pattern 3) and allocating top-up seats on a London-wide basis, 1997 and 1992 
 
 
Number of 
 
Election 
 
Cons 
 
Labour 
 
Lib Dem
 
Other 
 
Deviation from 
                                                 
3 Strictly speaking it would be possible to devise an AMS system with more top-up seats than local 
seats. But we know of no such system in operation, and it would be hard to identify its rationale. 
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top-up seats seats seats seats seats proportionalit
y 
 
Five 
 
1997  
1992  
 
  4 
11 
 
13 
  6 
 
2 
2 
 
0 
0 
 
 19 
 13 
 
Six 
 
1997  
1992  
 
  5 
11 
 
13 
  7 
 
2 
2 
 
0 
0 
 
 16 
 10 
 
Seven 
 
1997  
1992  
 
  6 
11 
 
13 
   7 
 
2 
3 
 
0 
0 
 
 12 
    7 
 
Eight 
 
1997  
1992  
 
  6 
11 
 
13 
  8 
 
3 
3 
 
0 
0 
 
 10 
   5 
 
Nine 
 
1997  
1992  
 
  6 
11 
 
13 
  9 
 
3 
3 
 
1 
0 
 
   7 
   5 
 
Ten 
 
1997  
1992  
 
  7 
12 
 
13 
  9 
 
3 
3 
 
1 
0 
 
    5 
    5 
 
Eleven 
 
1997  
1992  
 
  8 
12 
 
13 
  9 
 
3 
4 
 
1 
0 
 
    3 
     4 
 
Twelve 
 
1997  
1992  
 
  8 
12 
 
13 
10 
 
4 
4 
 
1 
0 
 
     1 
     3 
 
Thirteen 
 
1997  
1992  
 
   8 
13 
 
14 
10 
 
4 
4 
 
1 
0 
 
     3 
     3 
 
Fourteen 
 
1997  
1992  
 
  9 
13 
 
14 
11 
 
4 
4 
 
1 
0 
 
     2 
    3 
Notes: Table assumes a d’Hondt system for allocating top-up seats. 
 
 
3.34   With ten or more top-up seats the London-wide system will produce highly 
proportional and pretty stable results. Beyond 11 or 12 top-up seats the system will not 
consistently enhance proportionality, because it has already reached the lowest practicable 
levels. With 12 seats the Liberal Democrats receive a minimum of 4 seats across both 
elections (one more than they would get under most of the schema already reviewed). And 
the balance of seats between Labour and the Conservatives  reflects quite well their relative 
vote shares under both years’ differing configurations of the vote.  Note also that Table 3.8 
assumes a d’Hondt system for allocating seats, which we noted earlier is a system that often 
delivers larger DV scores. We conclude that with 14 local constituencies, an optimal level of 
top-up seats on a London-wide basis would be 12. So an Assembly of 26 members elected in 
this fashion could consistently be expected to produce very proportional results. This 
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performance is considerably better than could be expected with such a small Assembly under 
the classic variant of AMS reviewed above. Hence if keeping down the Assembly size is 
deemed important for other reasons, an AMS system with at least 12 seats allocated on a 
London-wide basis would seem the best method of electing it. 
 
LIST PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 
3.35    This type of system is used very widely in western liberal democracies, and will 
operate in Britain from 1999 for the European Parliament elections. Parties offer a list of 
candidates to voters in a large multi-member constituency. Voters choose  the party they 
wish to support, and the seats in the constituency are then allocated to candidates from each 
party's list in proportion to their level of support. In a ‘closed list system’ (such as that 
proposed by ministers for electing MEPs) voters simply mark one X vote against their 
preferred party. They do not have the opportunity to choose individual candidates: an 
unpopular candidate placed high on the list of a well-supported party would still be elected. 
We have assumed that a closed list system will operate below.   
 
3.36   By contrast in an ‘open list system’, voters can either vote for a party list as it stands or 
they can mark an X against (or write in) the name of the individual candidate within each 
party that they most prefer.  If they choose the latter option their decision not only counts as a 
vote for that party, but it has  a (modest) influence in moving the chosen candidate up or 
down the hierarchy of the party’s list - depending on how many other voters seek to back 
particular candidates rather than voting for the party list as it stands. Open list PR ballot 
papers are longer and more visually off-putting because candidate names are given much 
more prominence. 
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3.37    Critics of closed lists argue that by decisively breaking the link between candidates 
and constituencies, closed list PR would unacceptably strengthen the control which party 
leaders or the party machine would exercise over representatives. However, if the ranking of 
candidates on a party’s list is determined by internally democratic processes, such as an 
OMOV ballot of all party members in Greater London, there is a good chance both that the 
party’s list will include candidates from differing wings of the party, and that it will appear 
legitimate to the wider public. However, the more centralized party control of lists has also 
been seen by some observers as an attraction of list PR. There is reasonable evidence that 
where this system or an AMS system is used then there are stronger pressures on party 
leaderships to make their lists socially representative of the electorate - especially in terms of 
gender and in terms of race and ethnicity. In creating an Assembly which is socially 
representative of London, this feature of list PR may seem a desirable one. 
 
3.38     As with the AMS top-up representatives, the most important problem to be solved 
within any List PR system is to choose the rules which will precisely govern the way in 
which seats are allocated against votes. This problem is made greater the smaller the 
constituencies within which List PR is meant to work. There are a number of complex 
formulae for working out how to allocate seats, described above in paragraph 3.16 and 
explained in detail in Appendix 3. As in the AMS section we concentrate here on three 
better-known formulae for allocating seats - d’Hondt, Hare and Droop - without going into 
details about how they work. 
 
3.39     List PR could be run at several different levels. It would be possible to treat London 
as a single giant constituency and run an at-large election to select the members of the 
Assembly as well as the Mayor. Again such an option might be especially attractive if the 
Assembly size was fixed at the bottom end of the range discussed in the Green Paper, with no 
more than 24 members. A very considerable burden would be imposed on voters by such a 
decision, however - even greater than that which we noted in respect of a London-wide AMS 
top-up area . They would have to inspect perhaps three party lists with up to 24 names on 
each, and smaller lists from fourth or fifth parties. With round 100 candidates in all, such a 
ballot paper would look dauntingly complex, especially if an open list system was to be 
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chosen. There is a  considerable danger that London voters would react adversely to such a 
sudden switch from the normally simple ballot papers encountered in plurality rule elections. 
 
3.40    Nonetheless we ran a list PR election for a 24 seat Assembly on a pan-London basis 
and Table 3.9 shows the results. The different list PR formulae would have produced very 
consistent outcomes under either of the 1990s general election voting patterns. In 1997 
Labour would have gained 12 seats, the Tories 7 or 8 and the Liberal Democrats 3 or 4. Five 
years earlier the Conservatives would have won between 10 and 12 seats, Labour would have 
won 9 under all formulae, and the Liberal Democrats either 3 or 4. In 1997 the seats awarded 
to the ‘Other’ voters are somewhat illusory, since they were not in fact a homogenous bloc 
 
Table 3.9: Comparing outcomes with different formulae for a List PR at-large election, 
      1997 and 1992 
 
 
 
Con seats 
 
Lab seats 
 
Lib Dem seats 
 
Other 
seats 
 
DV score
 
1997:        d’Hondt 
 
  8 
 
12 
 
3 
 
1 
 
3 
 
                      Hare 
 
  7 
 
12 
 
4 
 
1 
 
3 
 
                    Droop 
 
 8 
 
12 
 
3 
 
1 
 
6 
 
1992:        d’Hondt 
 
12 
 
 9 
 
3 
 
0 
 
5 
 
                      Hare 
 
12 
 
 9 
 
3 
 
0 
 
5 
 
                    Droop 
 
11 
 
 9 
 
4 
 
0 
 
4 
 
but were split between numerous smaller parties. However, Table 3.9 does dramatize the fact 
that with an at-large List PR election the effective threshold level of votes needed to win a 
seat drops dramatically, to just 4 per cent with a 24 seat Assembly, and to just over 3.1 per 
cent with a 32 seat Assembly. Such low levels of required support could make representation 
in a London Assembly feasible for extremist parties, such as the British National Party. For 
this reason, plus the difficulties which such a large constituency would pose for voters and 
candidates, we would not recommend proceeding with an at-large list PR method for electing 
the Assembly, despite the reasonable degree of proportionality which would be achieved. 
Alternatively it would be possible to alter the List PR rules so as to require a higher votes 
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threshold before parties can win seats. However, such a device could seem an artificial 
constraint favouring established parties. And it would tend to increase the DV scores above. 
 
3.41    To create a multi-constituency basis for list PR elections we next considered how the 
system would operate using  the four quadrant areas - north west, north east, south east, and 
south west -  already discussed as units for allocating top-up seats under AMS.  We examined 
a 32 seat Assembly elected across the four quadrant constituencies, with 12 seats in the North 
West, 8 seats in the North East, and 6 seats each in the South East and South West quadrants. 
Table 3.10 shows the results. In 1992 the table shows that the three formulae would have 
produced exactly the same overall result. In 1997 each parties’ seats would have varied 
 
Table 3.10: Comparing outcomes with different formulae for a List PR election for a 32 
  seat Assembly held in four quadrant constituencies,  1997 and 1992 
  
 
 
Cons 
seats 
 
Lab seats 
 
Lib Dem 
seats 
 
Other 
seats 
DV score
 
1997:                  d’Hondt 
 
 11 
 
17 
 
4 
 
0 
 
7 
 
                                Hare 
 
 10 
 
16 
 
5 
 
1 
 
2 
 
                              Droop 
 
 10 
 
17 
 
5 
 
1 
 
5 
 
1992:          All formulae 
 
15 
 
 13 
 
4 
 
0 
 
5 
 
 
 up or down by one seat depending on the formula being used. Again the d’Hondt formula 
was favourable for Labour and least favourable for the Liberal Democrats. The DV scores 
were pretty similar across both elections and all the formulae, around 5 to 7 percent. 
(Although the Hare formula looks more proportional in 1997 than the other two, this is 
almost certainly an artefact of our method relying on survey data. The ‘Other’ vote would 
have been fragmented between several parties, and so the seat apparently awarded to them 
would in practice have gone to one of the three main parties instead). 
 
3.42    We looked at how this system would operate using the six partnership areas 
introduced earlier (and described in Appendix 2) as the constituencies. Table 3.11 shows the 
results. As with the AMS system using these areas, the DV scores here are unusually high 
and there was again a major difference between formulas.  The d’Hondt system apparently 
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favoured Labour under both the 1997 and 1992 conditions, and produced high DV scores. 
The Droop system favoured the largest party in each year, Labour in 1997 and the 
Conservatives in 1992 - when it would have given them four more seats than the other 
formulae. The Hare formula would have worked best in terms of minimizing deviations from 
proportionality in the two election years, giving the Liberal Democrats 6 seats on both 
occasions. 
Table 3.11: Comparing outcomes with different formulae for a List PR election for a 32 
  seat Assembly held in six partnership constituencies,  1997 and 1992 
 
 
 
 
Cons seats 
 
Lab 
seats 
 
Lib Dem 
seats 
 
Other 
seats 
 
DV score
 
1997:                    d’Hondt 
 
 11 
 
19 
 
2 
 
0 
 
13 
 
                                  Hare 
 
 10 
 
16 
 
6 
 
0 
 
5 
 
                                Droop 
 
   9 
 
18 
 
5 
 
0 
 
8 
 
1992:                    d’Hondt 
 
14 
 
 15 
 
3 
 
0 
 
10 
 
                                  Hare 
 
 14 
 
12 
 
6 
 
0 
 
  4 
 
                                Droop 
 
 18 
 
12 
 
2 
 
0 
 
11 
 
 
3.43   We also examined more briefly how the quintuple schema would have worked (adding 
in a large central constituency in addition to the quadrant boundaries). The five constituency 
areas are identical with the areas used for top-up members in the quintuple schema for classic 
AMS (discussed above in paragraphs 3.24 to 3.26). Table 3.12 shows that this approach  
Table 3.12: List Proportional Representation results, using the quintuple schema for 
         allocating all seats, 1997 and 1992 
 
 
 
 
Cons 
seats 
 
Labour 
seats 
 
Lib Dem
seats 
 
Other 
seats 
 
Deviation from 
proportionalit
y 
 
1997 election: 
1992 election: 
 
10 
14 
 
18 
14 
 
4 
4 
 
0 
0 
 
   6.8 
   6.7 
Notes: Table assumes a d’Hondt system for allocating top-up seats. 
 
would have performed pretty proportionately in both years, with virtually identical DV 
scores. The Liberal Democrats would have won  4 seats in both years, and the balance of 
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labour and Conservative seats would fairly closely match their vote shares, even using a 
d’Hondt system for allocating seats. Although we have not examined other allocation 
formulae here, we are confident that they will perform better than or equally with d’Hondt in 
terms of DV scores. 
 
3.44    There is quite a wide range of outcomes under List PR depending on the assembly 
size, constituency system and seat allocation formula being used. With more accurate 
boundary drawing and the correction of malapportionment effects present here, we might 
expect to see this variation reduce somewhat if a List PR system is implemented. However, 
the tables presented here serve to introduce a cautionary note - the choice of a system labelled 
List PR does not guarantee achieving proportionality, or an exact fit between votes and seats 
whatever the parties’ differing levels of support, or the patterning of that support. If we 
looked more deeply than we have here, at how seats are allocated to parties across each of the 
quadrant or partnership areas then we should find even more variations from one scheme to 
another. In choosing a list PR scheme it would be important to consider together the 
connected issues of Assembly size, constituency system and allocation formula. On the basis 
of our analysis, however, we conclude that a 32 seat Assembly using the quadrant or five 
constituencies schemas  would be the most reliably proportional system, and the most stable 
in its operations. Here the choice of formula would have least impact; and even with a 
d’Hondt formula either set of constituency arrangements would provide acceptable results. 
 
 
THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE 
3.45    STV has long been advocated by electoral reformers in the UK as the purest system, 
notably by the Liberal Democrats and the Electoral Reform Society. Its great attraction is that 
it delivers (broadly) proportional outcomes with a definite constituency system, yet without 
the use of party lists. This feature would avoid the criticisms of AMS and of the list PR as  
concentrating  power inside political parties in the hands of the leadership. STV goes to the 
other ‘extreme’ by creating a system where voters can choose between candidates, ignoring 
party labels if they so wish. Under STV every candidate must stand for election and receive 
individual votes in a multi-member constituency, one with at least 4 seats if the system is to 
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work proportionately. The larger constituencies become, the more accurately STV will relate 
parties' share of the seats to their share of the vote.  
 
3.46    On their ballot papers voters rank candidates in order of preference 1, 2, 3, etc as 
under the Alternative Vote. The key difference with STV is that there will be a much longer 
list of candidates, including several choices for each party. Figure 4 shows the STV ballot 
paper used in our 1997 survey. A unique feature of STV is that electors can easily vote for 
candidates of different parties in any combination that they choose. The voters’ preferences 
completely determine how different candidates put up by each party are ranked, and which 
ones are successful. Advocates of the system argue that voters can respond to many different 
factors - for instance, giving a high priority to choosing 'moderate' over 'extreme' candidates, 
or to women candidates, or to MPs with a good constituency record etc., depending on their 
preferences. Voters can number as many or as few preferences as they wish. 
 
3.47    The allocation of seats in STV is complex. A 'quota' is established given by the 
formula:  
  number of votes  
number of seats + 1 
 
First preferences are counted and the candidate with most votes above the quota is elected. 
Any 'surplus votes' of this new MP (those in excess of the quota level) are redistributed by 
looking at the second preferences shown. The new totals of votes (that is, first preferences 
plus any redistributed second preferences) are examined, and the next highest candidate 
above the quota is elected: in turn their surplus votes are redistributed to second preference 
candidates. This process continues until all candidates with votes above the quota level are 
elected. Some of the seats in the constituency will remain unfilled at this stage. The STV 
system then switches over to the method used in the Alternative Vote - that is, eliminating the 
bottom candidate, and redistributing their second preference votes. If another candidate has 
now reached the quota level they are elected and any surplus votes are redistributed: if no 
candidate still passes the quota level, the next bottom candidate is eliminated and their 
second preferences redistributed. This elimination and redistribution process continues until 
all the constituency seats have been filled by candidates remaining in the race passing the 
quota level.  
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3.48    The account above is necessarily brief. The actual STV counting process may well 
involve looking at some voters' very late preferences. For example, if voter A has cast her 
first ten preferences for candidates who are either elected or eliminated, it may be her 
eleventh preference which is being considered at a late stage in the STV election. Advocates 
of STV argue that every preference that voters cast can be effective, and will be taken into 
account by the system in deciding who should be elected. Hence voters can express their 
preferences honestly and without resorting to tactical voting of any kind. Just how valid such 
claims are is disputed, however. For example, a lot depends on the precise ways in which the 
'surplus' votes of candidates already elected are identified. There are different ways of 
achieving this calculation, depending on whether the STV election is being counted by hand 
as in British elections at present (which means that only simple methods of vote transfer are 
possible), or by computer (which can allow for more sophisticated methods of transferring 
votes). 
 
3.49    To examine how people would cast their preferences under this system we gave all our 
respondents in 1997 and 1992 an STV ballot paper for a five-member seat, shown in Figure 
4. (Appendix 1 also shows the information which our interviewers gave respondents about 
the STV ballot paper). In London  the ballots had at least 15  names on them, with four 
candidates each for the Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats, 1 or 2 candidates for 
the Referendum party in 1997 or the Greens in 1992, plus a range of other minority parties. 
The candidate names were drawn from actual people standing for London seats for each 
party. We tried to select some well-known candidates for each party (where we could identify 
any), and to achieve a mix of candidates including wherever possible an equal balance of 
women and men, and the inclusion of some candidates with recognizable ethnic minority 
names where possible. 
 
3.50    People had no great difficulty filling in the STV ballot. In both 1997 and 1992 only 7 
per cent of respondents who had voted in the general election made no response on this ballot 
paper; however, a further 10 per cent filled in only one box out of the possible 17 on the 
ballot paper. In 1992 54 per cent of our London respondents expressed preferences for more 
than one party on the STV ballot, and this proportion rose to 61 per cent on the 1997 STV 
ballot paper.  On both occasions, a large majority of  respondents cast their first preferences 
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on the STV ballot for the same party they supported in the general election. Conservative and 
Labour voters were the most loyal in their first choices, with around nine out of ten ticking a 
first preference from the same party on the STV ballot. Liberal Democrat voters were rather 
more  prone to defect, with a fifth choosing a different party in their first preference choice, 
while only three fifths of the Referendum party voters at the general election stuck by it on 
the STV ballot. As in 1992, when respondents made their second choices on the STV ballot, 
only two thirds chose the same party they voted for in the general election, and this 
proportion declined gradually to just over half at the third preference stage, and just below 
half at the fourth preference stage. Most major party voters cast most of their preferences for 
the party they backed in the real election, but there was slightly greater ‘cross-voting’ in 1997 
than five years earlier. 
 
3.51    The proportion of people making no response grew steadily from 6 per cent at the first 
preference stage to 35 per cent expressing no fourth preference.  However at the next stage 
there was a large jump, with 64 per cent of respondents who voted in the general election not 
expressing a fifth preference. This effect was due mainly to voters who are party loyalists 
having exhausted the candidates that they would vote for. A large majority of respondents 
stopped marking preferences after indicating five or fewer choices - the ballot paper made 
clear that the number of MPs to be elected was five. Conservative voters were least likely to 
continue expressing preferences. 
 
3.52   Turning from how people chose between parties to how they selected individual 
candidates to support, many people clearly cast a 'loyalty vote', putting their preferences 
within a party in the same sequence that candidates were positioned on the ballot paper. In 
both years ten per cent of all respondents cast a straight-run vote - giving their first four 
preferences to either the Conservatives, or to Labour, or to the Liberal Democrats, exactly in 
the order that the parties' candidates were arranged on the ballot paper. But this is a rather 
narrow conception of 'loyalty voting', since any minor deviation from the ballot paper order 
fails this test. A more general picture shows that in 1997 among Conservative, Labour and 
Liberal Democrat voters combined, 54 per cent gave their first preference to the first 
candidate in their party's column; 39 per cent gave their second preference to the second 
listed party candidate; 33 per cent gave their third preference to the third listed candidate; and 
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33 per cent gave their fourth preference to the fourth listed candidate of their party. These 
figures are again virtually identical to the pattern of responses in 1992. If voters did not study 
the candidate names in detail or did not recognize them (and many candidate names were 
unlikely to be widely known) then going with the grain of the ballot paper order was a 
perfectly rational response. As a result the primary influence on the number of votes a 
candidate received was their position on the ballot paper - since we noted above that the 
number of respondents marking preferences dropped off with the more preferences they had 
already indicated. 
 
3.53    The central point of STV is to maintain a direct link between representatives and 
voters in defined constituencies. But it is also important to have a sufficient number of seats 
in each area to be able to achieve reasonably proportional outcomes. With a 32 seat 
Assembly, the same quadrant constituency schema used above in List PR would produce 
constituencies varying in size from 12 seats in the North west, 8 seats in the North east, and 6 
seats in both the southern constituencies. Seats in this range should produce acceptably 
proportional results. Similarly the quintuple constituency arrangements discussed above 
under List PR would produce seats varying in size from 8 seats (in the central and two 
northern constituencies) to 4 seats (in the two southern constituencies). 
 
3.54   To simulate the STV election in detail, we mapped  the distribution of second, third 
and subsequent responses shown by our London respondents onto the first preferences votes 
in the general election, summed  to the level of each partnership area. Next we ran separate 
STV computer elections for each constituency under both the quadrant and quintuple 
schemas, and for each election, using a specialized STV election programme. Thus the data 
reported here raw on a total of 18 separate election simulations. The results are shown in 
Table 3.13. 
 
 53 
Table 3.13: Comparing outcomes  for STV elections for a 32  seat Assembly held in 
                     quintuple and quadrant  constituencies,  1997 and 1992 
 
 
 
 
Cons 
seats 
 
Labour 
seats 
 
Lib Dem 
seats 
 
Other 
seats 
 
DV score
 
Quadrant schema:                1997 
 
      9 
 
15 
 
7 
 
1 
 
 7 
 
                                                1992
 
   13 
 
11 
 
5 
 
1 
 
4 
 
Quintuple schema:               1997 
 
    9 
 
16 
 
7 
 
0 
 
8 
 
                                                1992
 
 14 
 
13 
 
5 
 
0 
 
 4 
 
Some distinctive features of STV are apparent under both schemas. The system would be 
highly favourable for the Liberal Democrats, giving them 5 Assembly representatives (just 
over 15 per cent of seats) in both schemas in 1992 when they had 15 per cent of the vote. In 
1997, although the Liberal Democrat vote went down to below 15 per cent, their number of 
representatives would have risen to  7 (that is, 22 per cent of all seats), only 2 seats behind 
the Conservatives on double their share of the vote. The Tories would have been somewhat 
under-represented in the Assembly in both 1992 and 1997, because of the effects of Labour 
and Liberal Democrat voters’ second or subsequent preferences.  (In 1992 London was one of 
very few regions of Britain where Liberal Democrat second preferences went more to Labour 
than to the Tories).  Tory under-representation would have been somewhat worse in 1992 
under the quadrant schema. In both years and under both schemas Labour would have been 
somewhat over-represented.  STV also produced a result which we did not find with any 
other system, namely the genuine election of an ‘other’ candidate. Under the quadrant 
schema a Green candidate would just have attracted sufficient second and subsequent 
preferences to secure one of the 12 seats in the large North west constituency in 1992. And in 
1997 a Referendum party candidate would similarly have been elected in the same 
constituency at a late stage in the seat allocation process.  Under the quintuple schema, no 
‘other’ candidate was successful, however. The DV scores for the STV arrangements are well 
within our proportional range of 5 to 10 per cent under both constituency schema. 
 
3.55    Defenders of STV sometimes argue that it would be possible to use the system in 
smaller multi-member constituencies with only three seats. And some commentators (such as 
the Institute for Public Policy Research and consultants KPMG in a recent joint report) have 
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argued for the use of an STV system in tandem with a small Assembly, at the bottom of the 
size range set out in the Green Paper.  To test these ideas we examined what would happen if 
a 24 seat Assembly was elected using the quintuple schema, which would give constituency 
sizes ranging from 8 seats (in the central and north east constituencies), through 6 seats (in 
the north west) to just 3 seats (in the two southern constituencies).  Table 3.14 shows the 
results. The Liberal Democrats would again have been over-represented in 1997 (by more 
than 5 per cent points compared with their share of the vote), winning one seat in every 
constituency. By contrast in 1992, with a larger share of the vote, they would have not won a 
seat in either of  
Table 3.14: Outcomes  for STV elections for a 24  seat Assembly held in quintuple  
                     constituencies,  1997 and 1992 
 
 
 
 
Cons seats 
 
Labour seats 
 
Lib Dem 
seats 
 
Other seats 
 
DV score 
 
   1997 
 
      6 
 
13 
 
5 
 
0 
 
11 
 
   1992 
 
   11 
 
10 
 
3 
 
0 
 
 5 
 
 
the southern constituencies - nicely illustrating the way in which a party’s fortunes under 
STV can depend on the strength of competing parties rather than just on its own share of the 
vote. Labour would have been over-represented by 5 per cent in 1997, and somewhat less so 
in 1992. The Conservatives would have been treated proportionately in 1992 but under-
represented by 6 per cent in 1997. The 1992 DV score is a good one, but that for 1997 is just 
beyond the 10 per cent level which we would regard as a proportional outcome for an 
Assembly of this size. 
 
3.56   In general the STV results were good, so long as a minimum constituency size of at 
least 4 seats was retained. The 1997 results for the 24 seat Assembly provide a reminder, 
however, that STV as a system does not include a direct mechanism which guarantees 
proportional outcomes. Our national study (Making Votes Count) shows that in 1997 
conditions, using five-member seats for Westminster elections,  STV would have generated 
some apparently anomalous results - such as fewer Conservative MPs than under plurality 
rule elections. There is only a slender risk that this kind of outcome could have recurred in 
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London Assembly elections, even under 1997 conditions. But the possibility of apparently 
‘anomalous’ results is still present.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
3.57   We have reviewed a great many permutations of different systems for electing an 
Assembly here, and in our background work for this report we have looked at many other 
contingencies not described above.  There are some systems which we believe should be 
ruled out, notably using plurality rule in single-borough areas - which would regularly 
produce high levels of deviation from proportionality, and in 1997 would have run the danger 
of creating a one-party Assembly. Substituting AV or SV within the same constituency 
system would not have improved matters - in 1997 it would probably have produced greater 
Conservative under-representation than plurality rule. 
 
3.58   Four systems emerge as offering the prospect of relatively stable and desirable 
outcomes, and each would have different sets of advantages: 
• A ‘classic’ AMS system - using 16 two-borough areas as constituencies to elect the local 
members, and either the four quadrant areas or the quintuple areas to select top-up members. 
This system would offer voters a manageable number of candidates to consider at both local 
and top-up levels. It would  retain a degree of direct accountability of representatives to 
voters in defined constituencies, and deliver proportional outcomes. 
• A London-wide AMS system - using 14 two-borough or three-borough areas to elect the 
local members, and electing 10 to 12 top-up members across London as a whole. This system 
would give voters direct accountability of the local representatives and representation of local 
interests, balanced by the presence of Assembly representatives likely to adopt more of a 
pan-London approach. It would deliver very proportional outcomes, but voters might have to 
consider rather large and complex ballot papers for electing top-up candidates. An 
imaginative approach to ballot paper design would be needed counter this latter problem. 
• A List PR system using either the quadrant or the quintuple areas as constituencies would 
also give proportional outcomes under all the main allocation formulae. Voters would have to 
cope with more candidates than with AMS local seats, and to keep tabs on a larger number of 
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incumbent members once they were in office. But their task in doing so would still be 
manageable. 
• An STV system using the quadrant or quintuple areas to elect a 32 seat Assembly would 
produce reliably proportional outcomes, and give accountability of representatives within 
large multi-member constituencies. However, there could be difficulties in using STV with a 
smaller Assembly. 
In all these systems the use of the quadrant areas (and to a lesser degree the quintuple areas) 
for electing some or all the representatives is likely to have a positive effect in encouraging 
parties and candidates to develop an appeal across the inner and outer London divide. 
 
 
 Part 4: 
ACHIEVING CONSISTENT AND MANAGEABLE  
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1   The London Mayor and Assembly will both be elected on the same day, so it is 
important to consider how the voting systems being used will appear to citizens.  If radically 
different voting methods are used, then there is a danger that a substantial number of citizens, 
especially first time voters,  the elderly or those who find reading difficult, may become 
confused or make mistakes in casting their votes. It will be very important for the new 
Authority that the voting methods used should seem simple to understand and consistent in 
their appearance. From voters’ point of view how votes are counted does not matter much  
compared with how ballot papers appear to them in the polling booth.  
 
4.2    It is also important to consider how the voting methods used for the GLA will seem to 
voters alongside other voting systems that they are using, especially  
- plurality rule, used for London borough elections, and for Westminster elections; 
- closed List PR used for European elections from 1999 onwards. 
All these systems currently retain voting with a single X. 
 
4.3    Once the Greater London Authority is created its political character and legitimacy will 
have impacts on wider thinking about electoral systems in Britain. We would expect to see 
the GLA  compared quite frequently with the elected Scottish Parliament and the Welsh 
Assembly, both of which use two X vote ballots and an AMS system. And the new Election 
Commission is due to bring forward proposals in 1998 on an alternative  system for 
Westminster elections to be put to voters in a national referendum. 
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4.4    Finally it is important to consider how the electoral systems for Mayor and Assembly 
will tend to work so as to produce either convergent outcomes across both bodies, that is 
victories for the same parties (or coalition of parties) in the same year. If the two bodies were 
controlled by opposing parties or coalitions of parties then problems of ‘divided government’ 
could occur. On the other hand, if every Mayor came into office with an automatic or 
exaggerated majority support for the same party in the Assembly, then the operation of 
checks and balances would be weakened. 
 
HOW VOTERS APPRAISE DIFFERENT BALLOT PAPERS 
4.5    In our 1997 survey we were able to shed considerable light on how a large group of 
citizens reacted to the experience of using ballot papers for the alternative systems. ICM’s 
interviewers presented the ballot papers to respondents and gave an initial brief explanation 
of how they should be filled in (details are given in Appendix 1). Most people were able to 
proceed straightaway, but if respondents had any difficulties in understanding, the 
interviewers were provided with an additional explanation to use. By looking at how often 
the additional explanation was called for, we can gain a measure of respondents’ difficulties 
with each system. Table 4.1 shows that just over a sixth of respondents required an additional 
explanation with SV and AMS and just over a fifth with AV. However, STV’s more complex 
ballot paper meant that 3 out of every 10 respondents needed further guidance in filling it in. 
In a representative national sub-sample of 1900 respondents in 1997 we also asked people to 
say how much they would like to ‘vote this way in the future’. Two systems using X voting 
were both popular, eliciting twice as many likes as dislikes - the Supplementary Vote (the 
first ballot paper that respondents saw) and the Additional Member System (the fourth ballot 
paper). Attitudes towards the Alternative Vote  (the second ballot) were mixed, with equal 
numbers liking and disliking the system. Our respondents predominantly disliked filling in 
the STV ballot paper (which came third in the sequence), by a margin of 2 to 1.  
 
4.6    These results strongly suggest that introducing SV or AMS for London elections would 
present few difficulties for voters compared with their existing experience. However, an AV 
ballot paper might well be less popular, and could need more preparation of voters on how it 
should be filled in. Using an STV ballot paper would clearly tend to produce more problems, 
perhaps suggesting that this system should only be adopted if there are strong additional 
reasons for using it. Our respondents may have disliked the STV ballot paper for two reasons 
- either because it requires more complex or lengthy sequences of numbers; or because the 
ballot paper with so many names on it appears more visually off-putting and complicated 
than ballots with fewer names. In either case, using full AV with a long list of candidates 
might look rather like the STV ballot paper, and require more complex numbering. And List 
PR elections with many candidates being elected at once could have the same problems, 
especially if an open list system were to be adopted. 
 
Table 4.1 (a) and (b): Responses to using alternative voting systems, 1997 
  
 
(a) Respondents requiring additional explanations of ballot papers 
%     Base 
AMS    17     8447 
SV    17     8447 
AV    21     1901 
S TV    30     8447 
 
(b) Responses to the question ‘How much would you like to vote this way in the 
future?   
Like  Neutral/        Dislike                    Majority  
Don’t know           for ‘Like’ 
 %       %      %    % 
AMS   54      25   22   +33    
SV   53      25    35   +31 
AV   37      27   53     +2  
STV   24      23   21    -29   
 
N =1901 
 
 
CONSISTENCY IN THE APPEARANCE OF BALLOT PAPERS 
4.7    Table 4.2 shows how the various systems for electing the Assembly will appear to 
London voters alongside the two majoritarian systems which might be used for electing the 
London Mayor, and the two other methods of voting used in elections operating in London. 
There are some cells in the table where the systems are identical, and in these cases voters 
would have no problems. We have graded other combinations as having a ‘very good fit’ 
where the method of voting is essentially the same, but the systems involved are not quite 
identical. In these cases there is a minor risk of voters making small mistakes - for example, 
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if AV was used to elect the Mayor and STV to elect the Assembly, then both systems involve 
numbering candidates in rank order - however, a voter might only fill in three or four 
numbers for the Mayor election, but if they did the same thing in a constituency electing six 
members of the Assembly then they would be ‘wasting’ some of their votes. We graded 
combinations as being a ‘good fit’ where voters complete the same task but it may have 
different meanings or implications - for instance, filling in a single X vote under plurality rule 
and under List PR, where it will have different effects.  Finally we grade combinations as 
having a poor fit where voters have to carry out quite different tasks, such as numbering 
candidates in one system and casting one or two X votes in another. There is a real danger 
here that people will complete one ballot paper in a manner appropriate to the other - for 
example, numbering choices on a single X vote ballot, which might lead to the ballot paper 
being declared invalid. 
 
4.3     The clear message from Table 4.2 is the importance of not combining systems where 
voters number choices and systems where they use X voting in the two London elections. 
There would seem to be a case for either plumping for full AV for the Mayor and STV for the 
Assembly, or using SV for the mayor in combination either with AMS or List PR for the 
Assembly. The latter option would also be much more consistent with the other X voting 
systems which London electors currently have to handle. 
 
4.4    We should qualify this comment, however, in the light of the Election Commission 
which is currently sitting and which may recommend a different system for adoption at 
Westminster, which in turn may be accepted or rejected by voters in a referendum. At present 
it seems likely that the voting systems most likely to be recommended will be either SV or 
AV on the one hand: or a form of AMS system on the other. An AMS system operates in  
Table 4.2: The level of fit between electoral systems used for the London Assembly and the systems used for electing the Mayor and 
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                   other bodies 
 
 
Systems used for electing the Mayor: 
 
Systems used for electing other bodies: 
 
Assembly systems: 
 
Supplementary Vote 
X votes to show 2 
preferences 
 
Alternative Vote 
numbering 
preferences 1 to n 
 
Plurality rule 
(Westminster and 
London boroughs) 
Single X vote 
 
List PR (European 
elections) 
 
Single X vote 
 
Plurality rule 
Single X vote 
 
Good fit 
 
Poor fit 
 
Identical 
 
Very Good fit 
 
Additional Member 
System 
Two X votes 
 
Good fit 
 
Poor fit 
 
Good fit 
 
Good fit 
 
List PR 
Single X vote 
 
Good fit 
 
Poor fit 
 
Good fit 
 
Identical 
 
Single Transferable 
Vote 
Numbering 
preferences 1 to n 
 
Poor fit 
 
Very good fit 
 
Poor fit 
 
Poor fit 
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Scotland and Wales, and public understanding of the London systems might well be fostered 
if these systems were to operate in a congruent way - for instance, using AMS for the 
Assembly and SV for the Major. 
 
 
GETTING THE MAYOR AND ASSEMBLY TO WORK TOGETHER 
4.5    There is a good deal of evidence in our 1997 and 1992 studies to suggest that ‘split-
ticket’ voting may well increase within the two election systems for electing the Mayor and 
Assembly. In our STV ballots the opportunity to vote for multiple candidates, beyond the 
three or four viable candidates normally found in Westminster constituencies, produced a 
significant blurring of party loyalties: 60 per cent of voters voted for two or more parties in 
1997. In 1997 when we gave respondents in Scotland and Wales the chance to vote on ballots 
for devolved Assemblies they gave significantly different responses from their choices in 
relation to Westminster elections. When we compared how respondents voted in the 
constituency and the top-up sections of the national AMS ballot paper in 1997, one in three 
of those voting Liberal Democrat in the constituency section voted differently in the party 
section; for major party voters the same figure was one in seven. Studies of areas of England 
and Wales where general election voting and local council voting took place on the same day 
in 1997 show that up to 20 per cent of voters may have cast votes for different parties across 
the two levels within minutes of each other. Given the likely perceived importance of 
candidate personality factors in elections for the London Mayor, we would expect this level 
of split ticket voting to increase.  Finally there is now a large body of evidence from the 
United States which suggests that voters there often deliberately split their votes for different 
bodies with a view to creating ‘divided government’, which is seen as less prone to 
exaggerated policy swings than single party control of both bodies. 
 
4.6  In Italian local government measures were taken in the early 1990s to guarantee that 
incoming Mayors would have a secure majority inside local councils (with 60 per cent 
support guaranteed to parties backing  the Mayor). These measures have not proved a success 
and party fragmentation has generally increased in Italian local politics. Similar measures are 
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conceivable in Britain, but we see no clear reason for looking at them further. We would 
anticipate that artificial controls of this kind would be unpopular if applied in Britain. 
 
4.7   If a broadly proportional system of voting is adopted for the London Assembly we 
would expect that this body will not show very large-scale shifts of seats between parties, but 
will show more moderate changes in line with alterations in party vote shares.  There is a 
strong probability that the Assembly majority and the Mayoral winner will come from the 
same party, so long as none of the major parties makes a grievous mistake in its candidate 
selection process by picking a conspicuously unpopular person to contest the election for 
Mayor. 
If a majoritarian system is adopted for electing the London Mayor, we would expect his or 
her political style to be consensual, aiming to create a broad coalition of support extending 
beyond any single party - for any other approach might risk defeat at a second round stage of 
counting the votes. This candidate orientation would provide the strongest guarantee that the 
Mayor would be able to work with an Assembly elected under a proportional system, since 
he or she would usually rely on support from more than one party in the Assembly. For 
example, a Labour Mayor elected with the support of Liberal Democrat voters under AV or 
SV would be likely to seek support from a coalition of Labour and Liberal Democrat 
representatives in the Assembly: if Labour could not command an Assembly majority the 
Mayor might well include some Liberal Democrat in his or her ‘cabinet’. Although the 1997 
votes pattern would have produced a clear Labour majority in the Assembly under some (but 
not all)  proportional system schemas, in 1992 there would have had to be some inter-party 
coalition or cross-party agreements in the Assembly. 
 
 
REGULATING PARTIES AND CANDIDACIES UNDER THE NEW 
ARRANGEMENTS 
4.8   The introduction of new voting systems raises some important problems for the 
regulation of political parties and of candidacies for the Mayoral election. The traditional 
British system has been that the state treats political parties as private law bodies, and they 
are not subject to specific governmental regulation. If an AMS or List PR system is adopted 
for electing the London Assembly, then this stance will have to change. Wherever there is a 
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list element in an electoral system it is essential that political parties should be registered and 
that the locus of authority within each party to define its list is clearly specified.  
 
4.9   If the arrangements already announced for Scotland, Wales and the European elections 
are followed, however, then the registration of political parties will not be accompanied by 
any other measures. The two most obvious further steps which government could consider 
taking when it registers political parties are:  
(1) to require registered parties to follow internally democratic procedures in candidate 
selection (for example, one member one vote procedures, OMOV), as governments have 
required registered trade unions and public companies both to do; 
(2) to require political parties proposing lists to follow the practice of ‘zipping’ or alternately 
naming women and men in their candidate lists under AMS or list PR. 
Both these steps could have advantages in the context of the government’s concern to make 
the London Assembly a socially representative body. Point (1) might also be helpful in 
excluding from elections extremist, fringe or joke parties which might otherwise complicate 
the election process. 
 
4.10   It will be particularly important for the success of the London Mayor how the political 
parties go about making their candidate selection. If all the established parties follow OMOV 
procedures in picking candidates the eventual general election will seem much more 
legitimate to most people, and the chance of there being dissident candidates from established 
parties will be reduced. If parties’ internal procedures seem less legitimate, then the election 
may not command such high levels of public support: dissident candidates would be more 
likely to stand against the official party nominees and more independent candidates could 
also stand, so the numbers of viable candidates would tend to grow. Given the importance of 
candidate selection procedures inside the parties for the direct election to an executive 
position, there is a case for the government to require parties to follow OMOV procedures 
internally, which might require the registration of parties intending to offer Mayoral 
candidates also. 
 
4.11   A final option worth considering is whether special nomination thresholds should be 
considered to sift out the candidates for Mayor. In the Irish system candidates for the 
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Presidency (elected by 2.8 million voters) must be nominated by a certain proportion of 
members of the Dail or by a minimum number of county councils. In general, however, these 
thresholds have been set rather high, so that only the two largest Irish parties could meet the 
requirements involved, and competitions for the Irish presidency have historically been rare. 
There would be a case for examining whether nominations for the post of London Mayor 
should depart from the British tradition of requiring only a smallish number of signatures and 
a small deposit. The two main options would be: 
(A) To require Mayoral candidates to provide a large number of nomination signatures 
supporting them, in recognition of the fact that the electorate for the post will be very large. 
For example, there might be a requirement of 1,000 or 2,000 signatures across London. 
However, there could well be a risk of extensive administrative effort being entailed in 
checking so many signatures, plus a risk of increased mistakes by candidates or their agents, 
with an accompanying danger of litigation close to the Mayoral election dates. 
(B) Candidates for Mayor could be required to have ‘special’ nominations from people or 
bodies already officially involved in London governance - for instance nomination by a 
certain number of borough councillors; nomination by one or more London borough 
councils; or nomination by a certain number of London MPs; or some combination of these 
requirements.  This idea would be helpful in preventing very small fringe or extremist parties 
in running Mayoral candidates, and hence could be helpful in making the election process 
simpler for voters and easier for them to vote effectively.  However, a requirement of this 
kind could well be seen as an invidious effort by established parties to prevent other 
legitimate political parties (such as the Greens) from running candidates for Mayor. It might 
also prove difficult to specify such special nomination requirements in such a way that the 
Liberal Democrats would be able always to run candidates.  On balance our recommendation 
would be to concentrate on choosing an electoral system for the Mayoral contest which will 
not generate excessive numbers of candidacies, rather than relying on additional nomination 
constraints - which experience in several countries suggests may have unintended side-
effects. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
4.12     We conclude that: 
• Voters should have few problems with the kind of X voting ballot papers used with the 
Supplementary Vote or AMS. However, ballots involving numbering were less popular, with 
STV ballots in particular more unpopular with voters. The public response to Alternative 
Vote ballot papers is intermediate between these positions. 
• The electoral systems used for electing the Mayor and the Assembly must be considered in 
combination, and two consistent systems chosen  which are easy for voters to use together on 
the same day. The consistency between the chosen systems and other electoral systems 
currently used in London, or likely to be used in the future, should also be carefully 
considered.  
• If a majoritarian system is chosen for electing the Mayor, and a reasonably proportional 
system is chosen for electing the Assembly, there should not be intractable problems of 
‘divided government’ or ‘gridlock’. We would expect these systems to produce consensus-
seeking candidates winning as  Mayors and congruent cross-party coalitions inside the 
Assembly. We see little risk under such arrangements of an absence of effective checks and 
balances/ There is likely to be a fair measure of ‘split ticket’ voting, whatever systems are 
chosen for electing the Mayor and the Assembly. 
• Government will have to register political parties if an AMS or List PR system is used for 
the Assembly. There is a case for government to regulate the internal processes of political 
parties so as to require internally democratic procedures in drawing up party lists, and in 
selecting a single candidate to stand for Mayor. 
• Special nomination constraints would be feasible as a way of restricting the number of 
Mayoral candidates, but would need to be carefully drawn up if they were to seem acceptable 
and not to prevent Liberal Democrat or respectable fourth party or independent candidacies. 
 
 
